"SELF RELIANCE: A PILLAR FOR PEOPLE'S DEFENCE
AND ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE"
(Second part)
Defending one's homeland is one of the primordial duties of the state. First by having its fundamental law mandates the creation of a citizen armed force, comes a defence policy which largely depends on three basic factors: threats, allies, and technology.
With these three factors would say keeps the order from maintaining its foothold. That by facing tensions which affects sovereignty and its institutions, requires the need of allies and of course, the much needed technology which is a critical factor in defence policy formulation, along with bilateral and multilateral defense exercises, as well as international military education, and training given by friendly countries that contribute to the knowledge base of a defence system.
But to overdepend on foreign support creates a pessimist view such as on how to defend what more to develop the country. As said earlier overdependence meant giving tis allies an opportunity to control as if a lord to a vassal- and Filipinos should realise that if it wanted an independent policy then why not push forward a domestic alternative not just to balance the country's defence system's inventory but to reinforce further. Such actions are meant also to save jobs and foreign reserves, and to expand domestic skill and knowledge instead of overdepending on foreign support such as those of its allies.
For remember:
"an image of a weak and dependent country would be formed because socially, economically, and militarily speaking, the said country does not have a concrete foundation and it will not stand on its own. Other countries would look down on the nation's capabilities thereby affecting its trade and social relations with other countries."
Thus, given the volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and abiguity of the setting, it becomes a duty rather than a necessary to push through a self-reliant program in national defence. Looking back on the country's past years in experimenting and even looking at the examples from other countries would say that this engagement requires much brain and brawn to support the defence system in terms of weapons, platforms, equipment, and ideas. But unfortunately the prevailing view of those looking at the west, along with budgetary limitation and several impediments did not attain much success in pushing a domestic alternative.
It is unsuprising tho, especially that since there are officers and bueaucrats whose mindsets been tied to those of foreign support/or investment, they just outrightly trump down or minimise the idea of self-reliance thinking as unnecessary in a technology driven world dominated by developing countries-and instead continuing its policy of dependence in foreign arms and in limiting self-reliance to those of repair and refurbishment of arms and armour, and in production of ammunition.
But despite this, this didn't stop the agenda of promoting self-reliance in the defence sector and in the economy. In a country having sufficient resources, labour power, and basic knowledge would say that it becomes suitable to set solid foundations of a self-reliant state as other countries did in its beginnings. And although true that critics looked at lack of best technology or expertise as reasons in less or not engaging in this venture, then does it mean stop it altogether? As far as this person and the concerned knows that countries who are driven by national survival hath to roll their sleeves, utilise know-how, and forge even at times they need to seek subsidiary assistance from other countries in order to improve their existing craft and know-how especially in pursuit of national survival.
There may be politickings and factions like those between who favour and those who don't, but this venture driven by the thought of independence will always be a long, continuous road those who adhere no matter how tiring it would be in traversing cannot stop.
The Australian experience: Should Filipinos create an example?
Prior to making this writeup, this writer read an article about Australia's quest for self-reliance and how its policies shaped its view regarding the need to bolster its defences and to upheld its soveregnty. That like the Philippines, for much of Australia's history, there has been a deeply held view that Australia was a vulnerable country incapable of defending itself.
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Above: Australian Sten (Austen)
and Owen Sub Machine Guns
Below: Sentinel Tank |
By looking at Australia's example, one would say that it takes political will and the changing direction from superpowers for a country to charter its course. Nixon's statement in 1969 didn't actually target Australia alone, but made the country treat as a situation wherein a country's independence should be first defended by its own and its brawn rather than depending on its allies and currying its support. In fact, there were earlier attempts in making Australia fully-engage in self-reliance from the 19th century, but countless politicking hinders its direction, except on cases like during the Second World War wherein the rise of Japan and its occupation of SouthEast Asia compelleth Australia to engage in bolstering its defences in itself with less support from both United States and Great Britain. There were times it became necessary to create its own tank and gun while waiting for allied aid- only to found that some of its weapons like the Owen and Austen submachine guns been well-liked by the Australian army during its participation in WW2.
And to think that being a land girt by sea, Australia has a lot of military choices other than relying on regional powers, and one of which was to engage in self-reliance, to become a "fortress Australia" as to opposed to waiting for its allies. This "fortress Australia" concept, commonly known as the "Defence of Australia" Policy focused on the defence of the country against external attack. The Australian Defence Force (ADF) was tailored to defending its own land and sea borders rather than developing capabilities to operate outside Australian territory as the previous policy of "forward defence" that was discredited in the public eye after that country's involvement in the Vietnam War.
In fact, one of its past assessments prior to the DoA stated that in certain circumstances, that "Australia might have to rely completely on her own defenceive and economic capacity for an indeterminate period". And consequently, it was assured that its forces should be designed primarily with the ability to act independently of allies. But what is amazing in its policy is those of self-reliance. From being reliant to its traditional allies, the turn of events hath brought Australia a realisation wherein the need for self defence as much necessary by means of developing its own doctrine to those of further creating weapons systems and adapting technologies to its benefit.
These words, however, was rejected by the Cabinet in the late 50s which insisted that the country should be prepared for a limited war and its forces should have "as far as possible the necessary organisation and techniques to operate effectively with major allies." And it was not until the 1960s that the with the changing political leadership was even prepared to entertain tentative ideas for the defence of Australia itself. This reflected the fact that (as already mentioned) in 1967 the British Government decided on withdrawing its forces east of Suez and the 1969 statement by President Nixon that America’s allies in the Pacific had to be able to defend themselves against all but a major attack, leading to the adoption of the DoA.
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| "Still, Self-Reliance is a serious issue" |
And that by emphasising territorial defence over those of "foward attack", Australian defence planning was primarily to protect Australia's northern maritime and air approaches (the "air-sea gap") against enemy advance. From there the ADF was restructured to increase its ability to strike at enemy forces from Australian bases, by increasing the size and capabilities of the Royal Australian Air Force and Royal Australian Navy, at the expense of the Army and the forces used to project power overseas. All through a range of force structure and acquisition programs, which includes:
- Retaining the F-111 force with a minimum update to maintain service capacity until the mid-1990s, while enhancing the capability of the F/A-18 Hornets to receive information from the JORN network;
- Retain the planned acquisition of the Collins Class submarines to replace the ageing Oberon Class vessels with a focus on "retain[ing] the program for six new submarines but establish a financial ceiling and, if necessary later, explore options for lesser capabilities";
- Acquire eight light patrol frigates (future-Anzac Class) to enter service from the early-to-mid-1990s, cancel the acquisition of a second fleet replenishment vessel, while cancelling the acquisition of an additional Tobruk Class and the six heavy amphibious landing craft vessels; and
- Focus on replacing the Air Force's 22 Caribou and 12 Hercules with a fleet of 20 new Hercules-type aircraft.
Additionally, these reductions saw a massive strategic reorientation focused entirely on the north of the Australian mainland, with a focus on directly monitoring the northern maritime and air approaches to the continent, namely the 'sea-air gap', and included:
- Raising three Regional Force Surveillance Units for long-range patrols in northern Australia;
- Redeveloping RAAF Base Tindal as an operational fighter base;
- Developing three 'bare bases' for the RAAF in northern Queensland and Western Australia to support the rapid domestic deployment of Army units in event of invasion; and
- Upgrade and enhancement of the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (JORN) to support the long-range air and sea defence of the 'sea-air gap'.
And true to its emphasis on self reliance, the DoA policy promoted technological development such as those of the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar network as well as those of the Collins class submarines for naval defence. But despite its reorganisation, this adoption of the DoA policy doesn't meant making Australia adopting a policy of neutrality or completely disbanding its ability to deploy forces overseas. It even continue to cultivate relations with its existing allies, what more of occasionally supporting campaigns that benefited Australian defence despite prioritising its territory as the ADF maintained a sizeable force of transport aircraft and amphibious ships and an infantry brigade capable of rapidly deploying overseas (the 3rd Brigade). Furthermore, Australian forces continued to be deployed overseas for exercises and peace keeping operations, and a small Australian military base was permanently maintained at Butterworth in Malaysia.
But as time goes by, this defence policy changed as the emergence of economic, political and military superpowers like China and India continues to develop its own capabilities being the economic, political and strategic powers at the core of Asia-Pacific Region. Additionally, Australia has also witnessed the development of the region’s periphery powers including Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand, each with competing priorities and objectives. These factors, combined with the rise of both complex asymmetric challenges and the rapid evolution of contemporary weapons systems, including hypersonic weapons systems and multi-domain weapons systems to national security, serve to challenge the established geo-political, economic and strategic security and prosperity of the region – while also effectively reducing the effectiveness of Australia's strategic moat, the 'sea-air gap', thus affecting the entire defence policy and leading to its replacement.
Yet despite its replacement doesn't mean an end to domestic advancement in regards to national def come to think of this, if Australia, being a large nation end compelleth its own to engage actively in resource mobilisation some decades ago or even Indonesia with its chain of isles but also actively engaging in utilising its resources, then why not as well the Philippines? Being a country that "takes pride" in its resources, labour power, and even history, the country that's also surrounded by sea and with allies's commitments uncertain must realise the need for bolstering its defences and fostering local growth, encourage local knowledge in promoting national sovereignty, economic justice, and territorial integrity, and to produce local alternatives to those procured from abroad.
Call it idealistic as those who insisted, but in seeing a partner country's past experiences and those of its own comes an inspiration and a lesson to learn with. For countries that engaged in self-reliance involved careful application of foreign knowledge for domestic purposes, of copying, adapting, and modifying much needed technologies, of improving its existing as well as setting new foundations that promotes agro industrial growth and its utilisation of resources to meet present and future demands, these would say that they're driven by not just to save its foreign reserves but to expand its production bases, to bolster its defences, lessen dependence and its subsequent blind faith on the developed countries, and improve prestige as those of its neighbours.
Revisiting "Project Santa Barbara", "Sumpak" projects
Similar to what happened in Australia and other countries, the Philippines did tried, at least theoretically the idea of self-reliance in protecting national sovereignty. Driven by the possible geopolitical setting and the possibility of arms embargo during the Marcos dictatorship, the government resorted to engaging in self-reliance in the defence industry through the SRDP Program.
Again, as what stated in the first writeup, the SRDP program emphasises the need for a local alternative to foreign-made arms and materiel, which also requires a gradual production of weapons and ammunition through the Government Arsenal and other domestic entities related to the defence industry. It is also within the program wherein the need for a "new concept in Philippine defence" been discussed-which includes guerilla warfare and an active home defence program.
But one of the most recognisable part of the SRDP program was the "Project Santa Barbara". Commonly being synonymous with the Marcos regime in which some critics are clamouring, this project deals much with the use of rocketry both for defence and for peaceful purposes. It was also one of the attempts, in breaking the dependency on foreign-made materiel so as to the utilisation of domestic skill for national defence and development.
Popularly known as the "BongBong" Rocket project, this marked by a series of experiments developed clandestinely as a point defense weapon, by the National Science Development Board (NSDB), University of the Philippines, and German engineers, all headed by Commodore Protacio of the Philippine Navy in Sangley Point, Cavite.
Furthermore, another source stated that the rockets used Solid Propellants recycled from the World War Two era Hedgehog Anti-Submarine Projectors used by the Navy or brought from old U.S. Navy materiel for the purpose of repurposing- that somehow assuming that a switch had been made at some point from liquid to solid propellant.
Since December 1972, there were series of 37 dynamic tests been conducted on the 180 MM rocket. And all of those tests were performed at Caballo Island near Corregidor in Cavite except for four firings which were conducted in Fort Magsaysay in Nueva Ecija. Different versions or configurations of the 180 MM rocket were used:
- short version, with fixed fins
- long version with fixed fins,
- long version with folding fins and
- the PATO (Pressure Assisted Take Off) type.
The launchers tested were the:
- Fixed-Open Frame (short),
- Fixed-Open frame (long),
- Truck-mounted tube launcher,
- truck-mounted open frame, and
- the Submerged Launcher for underwater firing.
The results of the tests showed that the Truck-mounted Open Frame launcher as the most appropriate for the 180 MM rocket, and the configuration is narrowed down to the short and long versions both with fixed fins.
Another project, known as SUMPAK, was a rocket launching system that uses foreign-made rockets. Orginally known as “Mk 40 Mobile Assault Rocket Combat Operational System (MARCOS)” which was ironically, named after the former dictator, was first created as an experimental trailer mounted modular MRL system initially developed by the PAF SDRDG in 1981.
Similar to other multiple rocket launchers, the SUMPAK is a rectangular box launching system holding twelve rounds of standard 2.75” or 70 mm Folding Fin Aerial Rockets (FFAR) with ranges of up to 10 km. Traverse (i.e. side to side movement) and elevation is done by manually rotating wheels connected to gears, and sighting was done thru a simple scope. It was made by the local company Dayton Metals Corp. in 1983.
The SUMPAK was created first as a towable platform, then reconfigured as a jeep-mounted version, which greatly enhanced its mobility and stability, and was intended for various applications such as point defense and shore-to-ship implacement. Firing standard 70 mm HEAT, FFAR.
These domestic-based rocket systems seemed to be interesting. For despite its limited resources, its effort to create a rocket artillery system shows that the Filipino as trying to break its dependency on foreign materiel if not trying to utilise its existing resources, including those of repurposing old materiel (such as solid propellants from a depth charge) in order to support its self-reliance defence program.
And because of these programs would say it was another source of pride for the people in promoting Science and Technology for National Defence. For the loyalist, these missile projects would call it an achievement for their idolised regime to promote a domestic-based deterrent. But to those who treat it less political would say that it was like any other government defence project brought out of a need rather than mere pride alone- thinking that those times were driven by a necessity to create a domestic-based alternative to foreign-made materiel.
However, due to politicking and the emphasis on foreign made materiel would say that these projects were shelved leaving most of these as mere experimental projects like the ones featured in the first part of this writeup. Politicking not just because these were made during the Marcos dictatorship but rather its pricey effort as any other self-reliance program that's as opposed to just procuring from other countries much-needed weapons for National Defence.
Conclusion
This second part of this note would say that the attempts for self reliance particularly in national defence symbolically showth the country's emphasis on the defence of sovereignty while trying to curry favour with its allies the much-needed materiel.
By citing history as examples, this note illustrates how projects have end as displays or sitting idly at archives waiting for a "concerned" officer to pick, thinking how officers deemed those as unneccessary experiments in favor of a prevailing foreign-sponsored policy of procuring secondhand trash and calling it as "brand new" equipment.
And also due to politicking and interests amongst military officers, members of the bureaucracy, and lobbyists, this venture, as any other idea meant to be taken seriously, rather end reduced to a mere rhetoric. Of course there's some continuity of creating, repairing, or refurbishing in the government arsenal or the creation of small arms in Danao, or those whose idea been written in defence journals for research; but the lack of support by the state what more of the order's reluctance in seriously promoting local-made arms and idea towards national defence shows the country's skepticism over their program while other countries seriously emphasise self-reliance not just part of their defence alone, but also in their socio-economic agenda.
Since there are critics regarding how the government expressed, the government hath been sensitive to the criticism that self reliance as not performing to its potential. Of course through its press releases and photographs would say that they are promoting or insisting the folk to offer recommendations to suffice problems and improve situations. But these suggestions do not seems to have reached their ears just like the programs most of which are rather filled in the archives.
For sure people may still equate self-reliance with autarky what more of judging it quite negatively in favour of their cherished globalisation and neoliberalism, but despite its equivalence, self-reliance doesn't entirely mean refusing trade with the outside world or minimising imports. Furthermore, it is not mindless autarkism in this modern eral to insist on self-reliance, But rather a practical philosphy which takes due note of strategic, political, and economic realities.
And its motivations for being self-reliant are many and varied, but most important among them are:
- cost effectiveness,
- dependability of continued supplies,
- avoiding compromises,
- efficient utilisation of domestic resources and knowledge,
- employment generation,
- adaptability.
The United States had it that way in its earlier years, with Alexander Hamilton advocating local enterprises to expand as such; or in the Philippines, with men like Salvador Araneta who expressed the need for self-reliance as an extention of promoting national interest not just minimising imports but also to save foreign reserves and in utilising resources including labour power and knowledge.
If the need for a self-reliant defence program now appears passe, there's still a real message in its intent. With the Philippines under Duterte claiming to be as "trying to engage in an Independent Foreign policy" then it is also to allow the country to go beyond its policy of overdependence and subsequently engage in a policy that the Philippines would really benefited from it. Even it's earlier statement on promoting industrialisation and the appointment of Ramon Jacinto as its point person became an object of discussion wether the Philippines as revisiting its "long lost interest" in the heavy industry; however, with the recent policy that rather leaned towards China or its continuing (un)free trade and other unequal agreements continue to be tolerated at the expense of its initial promises, then all these appeareth to be an empty rhetoric meant to snare patriots and concerned persons alike. Least for Marcos, historically and non-politically speaking, tried to stimulate his words with some policies even just to assume that he as a nationalist in the eyes of his people.
For sure Duterte and his camarilla spent the rest of the presidency assuring the people that their words shouldn't be taken too literally; but despite these assurances their policies it showed running counter to their statements. That be it the drug-related killings that much affected the poor, the TRAIN Tax Law that meant rising costs of commodities, or its China-leaning policy that doesn't mean giving up its existing unequal agreements with the United States, the present order has nothing to do with the words being expressed like democracy, socialism, or even the word being babbled outright like change- except of course, the diehards who still believe in his messages and the justifications spew by its apologists.
And thus affect self-reliance in defending, what more in buiding a country. There are good and sound proposals that hath been treated as political gimmickry if not been left rotting in the archives after being read about; and most of which continues to remain relevant regardless of its decades-past done. The question is, who's gonna take it into its realisation by uncovering from its dust and done in this present setting? After all, it is for the people who greatly benefited from flexing its own national muscle and to build, protect a potentially better nation.
https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-quixotic-quest-for-defence-self-reliance-time-to-move-on/
