“Not Yet Signed,” Is It So?
The recent conclusion of the ASEAN Summit and the arrival of United States President Donald Trump in Manila have demonstrated that certain questions remain very much alive in the minds of Filipinos. Whether the subject is Pax Silica, the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), or any number of arrangements bearing the familiar language of partnership and mutual benefit, the discussions have amounted to something more than the routine reaffirmation of Philippine-American friendship. They concern the continuing reaffirmation and reconsolidation of American interests in the Philippines, and the extent to which these interests are being presented as synonymous with Philippine national development.
This is particularly significant at a time when protests, arrests and police restrictions have accompanied the diplomatic ceremonies. With demonstrators questioning the economic, environmental and political consequences of Pax Silica, considerable attention was directed toward whether the proposed framework agreement would be signed during Trump’s visit. The answer, as it turned out, was no. “There will be no signing. There is no signing,” US Ambassador Lee Lipton told reporters at Malacañang, after Trump referred the question to him. President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. was equally categorical: “No, not on this trip. We are not covering that on this trip.”
For those opposed to the initiative, the announcement offered a measure of relief. For its proponents, it may provide an opportunity to reconsider the manner in which the undertaking is explained to the public, particularly after the controversy and ridicule that have attended its promotion. But the operative words are not on this trip. They do not constitute a repudiation of Pax Silica, much less a declaration that the Philippines intends to withdraw from the initiative. The country has already joined the American-led arrangement. What remains unsettled is the framework under which its more substantial commitments may be carried out. The announcement therefore raises the question of whether it represents a genuine reconsideration of policy or merely a postponement of the inevitable.
There is, after all, a familiar Philippine-American practice of changing the terminology of an arrangement without necessarily changing its substance. Consider the expression “American military facilities inside Philippine military bases,” employed in discussions of EDCA. It is a remarkable exercise in diplomatic vocabulary. What would ordinarily be understood by the public as an American military installation is described instead as a facility within a Philippine base, with Philippine sovereignty formally preserved, the Philippine flag flying overhead, and Filipino officers retaining their designated responsibilities. There are, of course, legal distinctions between an American-owned base and an agreed location under Philippine jurisdiction. These distinctions are not imaginary. Yet neither should they prevent public examination of the practical questions concerning effective control, privileged access, strategic requirements and whose interests ultimately prevail when the two parties disagree. A flag and a change of nomenclature cannot, by themselves, settle such questions.
It would hardly be surprising if a similar exercise in terminology accompanied the next attempt to promote Pax Silica. Instead of foreign control, there may be talk of strategic cooperation. Instead of privileged industrial enclaves, there may be references to technology corridors. Instead of dependency, there will be talk of integration into global supply chains. Instead of extraterritoriality, should such privileges be proposed, there will undoubtedly be a more agreeable expression. Such language is intended to reassure the public, although reassurance is not necessarily the same as a substantive guarantee.
The controversy has already exposed a considerable distance between the official presentation of Pax Silica and the questions being raised by those who may have to live with its consequences. Farmers and Indigenous communities have expressed apprehensions over land, ancestral domains and displacement. Environmental advocates have questioned the possible demands on electricity, water and other resources. Others have raised the broader question of whether an American-directed supply-chain arrangement can genuinely serve as an instrument of independent Philippine industrialization. These concerns cannot simply be dismissed as ideological objections to development. Nor can they be answered by invoking the familiar specter of communism, foreign agitation or national disloyalty.
Another round of promotional campaigns may reasonably be expected, complete with assurances of employment, technology transfer, investment and national progress. There may also be renewed attempts to portray opponents as enemies of modernization, or to revive the tiresome habit of red-tagging those who question official economic policy. Yet such arguments are hardly unfamiliar to the Filipino public. Indeed, what is remarkable about Pax Silica is not the novelty of its promises but their extraordinary familiarity.
For decades, the Philippines has been encouraged to attract foreign capital, create favorable conditions for investors, exploit its comparative advantages and participate more deeply in the international division of labor. The establishment of export-oriented industrial estates, business-process outsourcing centers and special economic zones has repeatedly been presented as evidence of national development. The language changes with each administration, but the underlying economic prescription has remained remarkably consistent.
The experience of the UP-Ayala Land TechnoHub offers a useful comparison. The development was promoted as a place where research, entrepreneurship, innovation and commercial enterprise could flourish in association with the country’s premier state university. There was much talk of technological progress, opportunities for enterprise and the productive use of university property. Yet its most visible commercial identity came to be associated with business-process outsourcing and office development. There is nothing inherently dishonorable about a call center, which provides employment, services and income. But a collection of office buildings occupied by outsourcing firms is not necessarily the technological revolution implied by the term technohub. Nor does the presence of computers, telecommunications equipment and multinational tenants automatically establish a domestic industry capable of developing its own technologies.
The issue is not whether such establishments perform useful economic functions, for they plainly do. Rather, it concerns whether the public was promised something considerably greater than what eventually emerged. The distinction is particularly relevant to Pax Silica, whose proponents have presented the initiative as an opportunity for the Philippines to enter more sophisticated areas of industrial production and technological development.
Suppose the proposed industrial hub in Tarlac proceeds as advertised, attracts foreign investment, provides employment and accommodates enterprises engaged in critical-mineral processing, semiconductor components and other advanced technologies. Such developments would certainly represent an expansion of economic activity, but they would not automatically constitute Philippine industrialization. An industrial estate is not necessarily an industrial policy, just as a factory is not necessarily a national industry. A semiconductor plant does not automatically confer upon the host country the ability to design semiconductors, develop the machinery used to manufacture them, or determine the commercial and technological direction of the enterprise.
A country may manufacture components without controlling the technology involved. It may process minerals without determining their final industrial application. It may host multinational corporations without developing corresponding domestic enterprises capable of competing with them. There is a considerable difference between participating in a supply chain and possessing the industrial capacity to create, sustain and direct one. This distinction is especially important for a country whose manufacturing sector has long been characterized by dependence on imported technology, foreign capital and externally determined markets.
The proposed arrangements under Pax Silica therefore deserve closer examination. Questions remain concerning whether Filipino-owned semiconductor manufacturers will be established, whether Filipino engineers will be encouraged to develop original designs and industrial processes, and whether domestic research institutions will receive the resources necessary to transform their discoveries into commercial production. Equally important is whether local enterprises will obtain meaningful access to technology, capital and markets, or whether the Philippines will merely provide land, labor, utilities, tax incentives and logistical facilities for enterprises whose principal decisions are made elsewhere.
Similar questions arise concerning the nature of the proposed industrial activities. The manufacture of finished industrial goods would have different implications from the production of selected components for export. Critical-mineral processing could contribute to domestic manufacturing if it were integrated into a broader industrial program, but it could also become another export-oriented activity with limited connections to the national economy. Should the ultimate result consist largely of warehouses, service establishments, foreign-owned production lines and office complexes, the distinction between Pax Silica and the industrial enclaves of previous decades would become increasingly difficult to establish. Merely describing such an arrangement as industrialization would not resolve the underlying issue.
The employment argument deserves equal scrutiny. Supporters have emphasized the prospect of job creation, but the number of jobs generated is only one consideration. Their quality, wages, security, opportunities for advancement and contribution to domestic technological capability are equally important. In an age when artificial intelligence, robotics and industrial automation are increasingly employed to reduce the need for human labor, promises of substantial employment opportunities require more than optimistic investment projections.
Advanced semiconductor manufacturing is capital-intensive, while highly automated industrial processes do not necessarily employ workers in numbers comparable to traditional factories. Construction may provide temporary employment, but the eventual operation of an industrial complex may require a much smaller and more specialized workforce. This does not make automation undesirable, since technological progress is indispensable to modern industry. It does, however, raise the question of whether the resulting productivity will benefit society more broadly or merely increase the returns of those who own and control the machinery.
The familiar prescription of upskilling is likely to feature prominently in official responses to these concerns. Workers, graduates, engineers and unemployed Filipinos will be encouraged to acquire additional qualifications, attend training programs and adjust themselves to the changing requirements of industry. The implication is that the solution to structural weaknesses in the Philippine economy rests primarily upon the individual’s willingness to improve his qualifications and adapt to the market. Susmaryosep. Such an approach risks reducing a national economic problem to a matter of personal preparedness.
Education and technical training are indispensable to industrial development, but training workers for industries they neither own nor control is not, in itself, a national development strategy. Nor should the obligation to improve one’s qualifications become a convenient excuse for low wages, insecure employment and the absence of domestic enterprises capable of employing skilled Filipinos productively. An abundance of trained engineers offers limited national benefit if the country cannot provide them with opportunities to design, manufacture and develop technologies of their own. A sophisticated workforce may remain economically dependent if its principal function is to supply labor to foreign enterprises under conditions determined elsewhere.
The central issue is therefore not whether the Philippines should reject foreign investment, international cooperation or advanced technology. Such a position would be both impractical and unnecessary. The issue is whether these arrangements are subordinate to a Philippine industrial program or whether Philippine economic policy is being subordinated to the requirements of arrangements devised abroad. There is a fundamental difference between inviting foreign enterprises to participate in a national industrial undertaking and constructing a national economic policy around the requirements of foreign enterprises. The former may contribute to development, while the latter risks perpetuating the very dependency that development is supposed to overcome.
A serious Philippine industrial program would begin with the country’s own requirements: dependable and affordable energy, modern transportation, agricultural productivity, machinery, chemicals, steel, electronics, engineering capability and a domestic market capable of sustaining productive enterprises. It would encourage Filipino manufacturers, public research institutions and domestic investors to undertake projects that have too often been dismissed as impractical, uncompetitive or insufficiently attractive to foreign capital. It would regard technology transfer not as a ceremonial phrase in an investment prospectus but as a measurable process through which Filipino enterprises and institutions acquire the capacity to innovate independently. Industrial development, in this sense, is not merely the construction of industrial buildings but the creation of productive capabilities that a nation can retain, improve and direct according to its own needs.
These are the standards by which Pax Silica ought to be judged. If its proponents genuinely believe that the initiative will strengthen Philippine industry, they should be prepared to explain the proposed ownership arrangements, the use of land and public resources, the safeguards for affected communities, the obligations of foreign investors and the specific technological capabilities that Filipino institutions are expected to acquire. They should also explain why the country must depend upon an American-led strategic supply-chain initiative to accomplish objectives that ought already to be central to its own national development program.
The recent protests have demonstrated that these questions are no longer confined to economists, academics or political activists. They are being discussed by students, workers, farmers and ordinary citizens who have every reason to question how their country’s resources will be employed. The absence of a signing ceremony may have temporarily relieved the immediate political pressure, but it has not disposed of the controversy. Indeed, it may have merely postponed the occasion on which the government will be required to provide more substantial answers.
For now, the official position is that there will be no signing during Trump’s visit. That is a statement of diplomatic scheduling, not necessarily of economic reconsideration. The initiative remains in place, along with the proposed industrial development and the unresolved questions of sovereignty, land, resources, employment and technological independence. Equally persistent is the familiar temptation to present an externally directed economic arrangement to the Filipino public under the agreeable language of modernization.
The country’s experience with previous development arrangements suggests that promises of prosperity are easier to make than the industrial foundations upon which genuine prosperity depends. A nation may possess industrial parks without possessing an industrial economy, export advanced components without mastering advanced technology, and attract billions in foreign investment without acquiring the capacity to determine its own economic future. It may even be told that it is progressing, although the ownership, direction and principal benefits of that progress remain largely beyond its control.
The proposed program may yet prove beneficial, but that must be demonstrated rather than presumed. It must be measured against the interests of the Philippine people, not merely against the requirements of American supply-chain security. Otherwise, the undertaking risks becoming another familiar arrangement presented in new packaging: the promise of opportunity, the appearance of industrial sophistication, and the continued expectation that Filipinos will supply the land, labor and resources while others determine the terms.
The program may sound almost believable, but the underlying relationship still resembles that of an owner’s dog kept on a leash, permitted to move and perform within boundaries determined by someone else. The comparison may be unflattering, but it reflects the danger of mistaking limited economic participation for genuine industrial independence. The announcement that Pax Silica would not be signed during Trump’s visit does little to resolve that contradiction. The more important question is not when the agreement will be signed, but whether the Philippines will possess the authority, industrial capacity and political determination to decide, in substance rather than merely in ceremony, the terms of its participation.