Tuesday, 10 November 2026

What the Summit Will Not Settle

What the Summit Will Not Settle

 Pax Silica, the unfinished question of Philippine industrialization,
and the economic promises of a region caught 
between competing great powers. 


The clarification by United States Ambassador Lee Lipton that no announcement concerning the proposed Pax Silica Economic Security Zone will take place during the forthcoming ASEAN Leaders’ Summit in Manila has settled a matter of diplomatic scheduling without necessarily diminishing the controversy surrounding the undertaking. The absence of a signing ceremony does not imply that negotiations have been abandoned, nor does it remove the questions that have followed the proposed development since its announcement. Philippine trade officials continue to anticipate the conclusion of a legal framework before the end of the year, while Washington maintains its interest in organizing more secure industrial supply chains through the American-led initiative. 

Indeed, the denial may have intensified rather than relieved public skepticism. For those already troubled by the proposed industrial zone’s implications for land, labor and national economic policy, the ambassador’s clarification provides no definitive answer concerning its eventual activities, financing or productive organization. The presence of President Donald Trump at the ASEAN Summit does not establish that Pax Silica will be discussed privately with Philippine officials, although the possibility of broader conversations concerning investment and strategic manufacturing cannot reasonably be excluded. The undertaking remains part of an existing bilateral economic relationship, and the absence of an announcement cannot be confused with the disappearance of its strategic purpose. 

The Philippines formally joined the Pax Silica initiative last April, when the United States also announced plans for a proposed 4,000-acre industrial zone within New Clark City in Tarlac. The agreement now being negotiated concerns the development’s separate legal framework. Intended to support critical minerals processing, semiconductor-related manufacturing and other advanced industrial activities, the project forms part of the larger Luzon Economic Corridor and the American effort to secure essential inputs for the industries of artificial intelligence, advanced computing and technological manufacturing. 

The distinction between the wider initiative and the proposed economic security zone is important. Washington is undertaking industrial policy for reasons associated with its own economic security. The Philippines, meanwhile, is being invited to participate in that industrial strategy at a time when its own productive foundations remain insufficiently developed. What is described by the United States as the securing of supply chains is being presented domestically as an opportunity for industrialization, innovation and economic modernization. It is precisely this apparent equivalence that critics of the undertaking have called into question. 

Their objections extend beyond whether the project will attract investment, generate exports or create employment. Labor researchers and other opponents have questioned whether the initiative would reproduce existing forms of foreign-directed production beneath the language of technological advancement. They warn that a country already dependent upon external capital and industrial technologies may be encouraged to celebrate its incorporation into another sophisticated supply chain without acquiring greater control over the productive resources, technologies and economic decisions upon which its own development depends. 

There is a historical basis for the skepticism. The Philippines has long been an attractive location for export-oriented manufacturing, particularly in electronics. Its workers have acquired considerable industrial experience, and foreign enterprises have established facilities whose products enter some of the world’s most technologically advanced industries. Yet the expansion of these activities has not produced a corresponding development of domestic machinery manufacturing, advanced metallurgy, specialized industrial materials or the scientific and engineering institutions required to sustain a more independent productive economy. 

The semiconductor industry illustrates the distinction. The country possesses extensive capabilities in assembly, testing and packaging, activities that require skilled labor and technologically sophisticated equipment. But its participation remains concentrated in particular stages of production, while advanced fabrication, design and the manufacture of specialized industrial machinery are undertaken principally in other economies. The World Bank’s April 2026 examination of the Philippine semiconductor cluster identified this concentration and estimated that foreign value added accounted for roughly half of gross exports in computer and electronics manufacturing. 

Such figures do not diminish the abilities of Filipino workers or the economic contribution of the industry. They demonstrate that the technological sophistication of an exported product cannot be equated with the industrial capabilities possessed by the country from which it is exported. A semiconductor component may pass through a Philippine factory while the machinery, intellectual property, specialized materials and most important productive decisions remain controlled elsewhere. 

The distinction is particularly important now that the language of innovation has become almost inseparable from the promotion of advanced industrial estates. There is a tendency to assume that the establishment of a facility associated with artificial intelligence or semiconductors necessarily constitutes national technological progress. Yet a country does not acquire the capacity to design and manufacture advanced industrial equipment simply because such equipment is installed within its territory. Nor does the operation of sophisticated machinery necessarily create the domestic institutions required to improve or reproduce that machinery independently. 

This is where the repackaging of Pax Silica as industrialization becomes both contradictory to, and complementary with, the existing economic policies that its supporters have inherited. 

On one hand, the initiative appears to contradict the neoliberal assumption that the organization of production should be determined principally through market competition and the exploitation of existing comparative advantages. Its American sponsors have openly identified certain industries as strategically important and have undertaken to influence their location, financing and productive relationships. The purpose is not simply to permit the unrestricted operation of international markets, but to secure industrial capacities regarded as essential to national economic strength. 

On the other hand, the proposed Philippine arrangement may complement the investment-oriented economic policies that have long characterized the country’s development strategy. Foreign enterprises are expected to provide capital and technology, while the host economy supplies land, labor, infrastructure and access to natural resources. The government facilitates the undertaking through institutional arrangements and investment promotion, while the direction of production remains closely connected with international commercial and strategic requirements. 

The contradiction is therefore less complete than it first appears. Industrial planning is being undertaken by an advanced industrial power for its own strategic purposes, while a developing country is invited to participate through the very economic framework that has repeatedly made foreign investment the principal measure of modernization. The United States is seeking to strengthen its command over industrial production; the Philippines is seeking investment within a system whose technological foundations are substantially controlled abroad. 

This dual character helps explain why the presentation of Pax Silica as a national industrial breakthrough has been received skeptically by critics of the country’s prevailing economic policies. After decades of liberalization, globalization and the promotion of comparative advantage, the arrival of another foreign-led undertaking under the banner of innovation can appear less a departure from the established development model than its continuation under more fashionable terminology. 

The question is not whether semiconductor manufacturing constitutes industrial activity. It plainly does. Nor is there reason to dismiss data centers as technologically unimportant; they provide computing infrastructure essential to numerous modern services and increasingly sophisticated digital applications. But these activities are not interchangeable with the development of an integrated national industrial economy. Their significance depends upon the productive capabilities acquired, the technological knowledge developed, the industries established around them and the extent to which their operation contributes to domestic economic independence. 

A data center may employ sophisticated computing systems without producing the processors, electrical equipment or other advanced technologies upon which it depends. A factory may assemble or test microchips without manufacturing the equipment used in semiconductor fabrication. Even the establishment of a wafer-fabrication plant would not, by itself, create a complete semiconductor industry if the essential machinery, materials, design capabilities and technological knowledge remained concentrated elsewhere. 

The government’s recent clarification that the proposed Pax Silica zone will not include data centers is therefore material to the description of the project. Earlier public discussion had associated the development with a large artificial intelligence hub, prompting concerns about substantial power and water requirements. Officials now emphasize mineral processing and the production of high-technology components for semiconductor and AI-related industries. That distinction should be accurately reflected in public reporting. It does not, however, settle the larger question of whether these activities would result in the development of nationally rooted productive capabilities. 

What is often missing from the official discussion is a conception of innovation that extends beyond the application of technologies acquired from foreign enterprises. Innovation cannot be reduced to the importation of sophisticated equipment or the operation of factories producing goods associated with advanced industries. It also concerns the ability of domestic institutions to create technologies, adapt them to social and economic requirements, improve production processes and translate scientific knowledge into useful industrial applications. 

The Philippines possesses substantial intellectual and scientific resources that have not been fully incorporated into its productive economy. Universities, public research institutions, technical agencies and individual inventors have generated studies, designs, prototypes and technologies intended to address problems in agriculture, energy, manufacturing, transportation and public services. Yet the relationship between research and production remains weak, while the institutions responsible for transferring knowledge into practical applications confront persistent limitations in funding, staffing and industrial support. 

The question is not merely rhetorical. A study released in 2026 by the Philippine Institute for Development Studies examined the implementation of the country’s Technology Transfer Act through publicly funded agricultural and food innovations. Researchers compiled an inventory of 1,340 technologies from government institutions and found considerable obstacles to commercialization, including inadequate institutional capacity, regulatory difficulties, incomplete product development and insufficient financing for enterprises seeking to adopt the technologies. 

The study reported only ₱23.5 million in aggregate royalties from these technologies between 2021 and 2025. Royalty income is not a complete measure of technological adoption, particularly where publicly funded research may be transferred without payment or employed for noncommercial purposes. Nevertheless, the findings demonstrate the difficulties of connecting public research with sustained production. Even technologies that possess practical value can encounter institutional and financial barriers that prevent their wider use. 

The problem had already been acknowledged by officials of the Department of Science and Technology. In July 2025, a senior DOST official offered a rough estimate that only around 10 to 20 percent of government-funded technology projects had reached commercialization. The figure was not presented as a comprehensive statistical inventory, but it reflected a difficulty familiar to researchers and technical institutions: the distance between creating a workable technology and establishing the industrial, financial and administrative arrangements necessary to put it into productive use. 

There is something profoundly unsatisfactory about celebrating prospective foreign technological investment while domestically generated research struggles to move beyond laboratory demonstrations, pilot projects, government repositories and university archives. Not every study or prototype is commercially viable, and research must be subjected to technical and economic assessment. But a country that has invested public resources in developing scientific knowledge ought to possess institutions capable of determining which discoveries can be developed, improved and employed for national productive purposes. 

Too often, the fate of technically promising work is decided not by its potential contribution to the needs of society, but by the absence of an enterprise capable of financing its application, the difficulty of securing necessary approvals or the inability of public institutions to sustain the transition from research to production. Under such conditions, useful studies can remain largely within academic circulation, becoming material for subsequent research rather than instruments of economic development. 

The phrase moot and academic acquires an unfortunate significance in this setting. Research addressing actual problems in agriculture, industrial production or public infrastructure can be treated as academically worthwhile but administratively impractical, technically premature or commercially unattractive. Meanwhile, the availability of foreign technology is presented as evidence that industrial modernization is already within reach. 

This contrast should prompt examination of the institutions through which technological priorities are established. The issue is not whether the Philippines should exclude foreign scientific cooperation, which would be neither realistic nor desirable. It is whether public research, domestic engineering and indigenous technical capabilities are being given a central place in the organization of production, or whether they are expected merely to supplement an industrial development strategy determined principally by the investment decisions of multinational enterprises. 

A national industrial program would require the deliberate connection of universities, public laboratories, industrial financing and manufacturing enterprises. Scientific research would have to be supported beyond the production of papers, prototypes and patents, while domestic industries would need the capacity to employ the resulting technologies. The absence of such relationships helps explain why a country capable of producing technically accomplished workers and researchers remains dependent upon imported machinery and specialized equipment for much of its industrial activity. 

The problem is closely related to the doctrine of comparative advantage. For generations, Philippine economic policy has emphasized the activities in which the country possesses favorable relative costs: an educated and comparatively inexpensive workforce, abundant natural resources, geographical accessibility and established experience in particular export industries. The implication has been that the country’s modernization would proceed most effectively through the expansion of these advantages within the international economy. 

Comparative advantage can explain the gains arising from specialization and trade, but its transformation into a permanent developmental prescription raises a historical difficulty. Existing productive advantages are themselves the consequences of previous investment, technological accumulation and institutional development. A country concentrated in exporting minerals may possess such an advantage because it has not developed the metallurgical and manufacturing facilities required for more advanced production. The advantages available to it are therefore not independent of the very industrial weaknesses that economic development ought to overcome. 

The pole-vaulting strategy advanced during the administration of Fidel V. Ramos provided an influential expression of this approach. Ramos spoke of identifying competitive economic niches, capitalizing upon the strengths of neighboring economies and accelerating reforms intended to free markets. He also emphasized innovation and productivity, but these objectives were situated within a developmental program that placed considerable confidence in globalization, private investment and the country’s capacity to compete within existing international production networks.

It would be inaccurate to suggest that pole-vaulting rejected technological advancement or industrial modernization. The more substantial criticism concerns the manner in which it expected those outcomes to emerge. The development of productive capabilities was closely associated with the ability to attract investment and exploit commercially favorable opportunities, rather than with a comprehensive national program for establishing industries whose initial development might require substantial public financing, technological acquisition and protection from more advanced competitors. 

The experience of the succeeding decades provides grounds for questioning that assumption. The Philippines expanded its participation in electronics, commercial services and international labor markets while remaining dependent upon imported industrial technologies and equipment. Global integration generated economic activity, but it did not automatically produce the machinery industries, metallurgical facilities and scientific institutions necessary for greater productive independence. 

The persistence of this condition cannot be attributed exclusively to foreign governments. It also reflects the organization of domestic capital. The country’s largest business groups have accumulated substantial wealth through real estate, construction, finance, distribution, utilities, logistics and other commercial activities. Several possess important manufacturing and infrastructure interests, but their collective economic prominence has not eliminated dependence upon external productive systems. 

The profitability of commercial intermediation does not necessarily require the development of domestic machinery or advanced technological industries. An enterprise can prosper by supplying land, infrastructure, services or distribution networks to multinational manufacturers without acquiring the capabilities necessary to reproduce their equipment. The accumulation of private wealth and the development of national productive forces may consequently proceed at markedly different rates. 

This is one reason why critics of Pax Silica question whether the proposed undertaking would substantially change the country’s industrial structure. Foreign investment may establish sophisticated facilities while domestic capital obtains profitable positions in construction, property, infrastructure and supporting services. The resulting economic activity may increase without creating the productive relationships necessary to overcome dependence upon external technology. 

The mineral trade provides another illustration. In 2025, the Philippines exported approximately 55.3 million metric tons of nickel ores and concentrates, worth around US$1.48 billion. Most went to China, with Indonesia accounting for nearly all the remainder. These exports supply industrial systems possessing the metallurgical and manufacturing capabilities necessary to transform Philippine ores into higher-value materials. 

The dominance of Chinese purchasers has been invoked by supporters of Pax Silica as evidence that American investment could provide an alternative source of industrial development. Yet the underlying issue is not simply whether Chinese enterprises should continue to purchase Philippine nickel. It is why the Philippines has not developed sufficiently extensive downstream production to employ more of its own mineral resources within a national manufacturing system. 

China’s industrial requirements and America’s strategic supply-chain objectives are not identical, but both may influence the productive use of Philippine resources without necessarily creating a corresponding degree of national industrial authority. A change in the nationality of foreign capital does not automatically alter the country’s position within the international division of labor. 

The historical development of advanced industrial economies provides a different understanding of economic transformation. The manufacturing strength of the United States did not arise simply through acceptance of its original position relative to British industry. The arguments associated with Alexander Hamilton and the American System emphasized the deliberate cultivation of national manufacturing capabilities. Friedrich List similarly challenged the expectation that countries possessing unequal industrial strength should permanently organize trade as though their productive capacities were already comparable. 

These traditions recognized that productive advantages could be created through institutions capable of mobilizing capital, infrastructure, technology and labor over extended periods. Their significance lies in the recognition that the development of industry requires more than participation in international commerce. It requires the progressive construction of the productive capabilities through which an economy can transform its own resources. 

The contemporary American government has, in its own way, acknowledged the strategic importance of industrial policy. Washington now treats semiconductors, critical minerals and advanced computing as industries requiring direct political attention and organized international production arrangements. China likewise employs extensive industrial coordination and public investment to sustain its manufacturing capabilities. 

The contrast with the economic prescriptions long encouraged among developing countries is striking. Advanced industrial powers increasingly regard their productive capabilities as matters of national security, while the Philippines continues to be urged to attract investment by offering resources, labor and commercially favorable conditions. The foreign sponsor is pursuing strategic industrial policy; the host economy is expected to find development within that strategy. 

The distribution of costs and benefits under such arrangements is therefore central to the criticisms advanced by labor organizations. A production facility can be technologically advanced while employing workers under conditions of limited bargaining power, insecure contracts or inadequate compensation. It can generate substantial output while preserving a narrow domestic share of the value produced. The existence of industrial employment is important, but the social significance of that employment depends upon wages, working conditions, security, rights and the opportunities available for technical advancement. 

This is particularly relevant to an economy in which the supply of comparatively inexpensive and technically capable labor has long been advertised as an advantage to foreign investors. Productivity improvements do not automatically produce corresponding improvements in workers’ incomes or influence over production. Their benefits are distributed through institutions and relations of ownership that determine how the wealth generated by labor is appropriated. 

The opposition’s concern that working people may bear the costs of industrial development should therefore be understood in these terms. It is not an assertion that every prospective enterprise will necessarily violate labor rights. Rather, it questions a model in which the expansion of production is treated as evidence of social progress without sufficient examination of how workers participate in, and benefit from, the productive process. 

The controversy in Tarlac gives these concerns an additional territorial and environmental dimension. Indigenous Aeta communities and farmers in Capas have expressed apprehensions that the proposed industrial zone could threaten ancestral lands, agricultural livelihoods, water sources and surrounding ecosystems. Their objections reflect the importance of land not merely as a commercial asset but as a productive resource and a foundation of community life. 

Government authorities maintain that the development will be situated within designated buildable areas of New Clark City and that established communities should not be displaced. These assurances require assessment against the eventual project boundaries, existing land rights and the industrial activities proposed. The fact that a project has been announced does not establish that unlawful displacement has occurred, but neither does a development designation determine every legal and social question concerning the people who live or work within the surrounding territory. 

The issue of eminent domain also requires distinction. The Constitution permits the taking of private property for public use subject to just compensation, while the Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act establishes separate protections concerning ancestral domains, consultation and consent. The application of these laws depends upon the legal status of the land and the particular activities proposed. Neither the commercial importance of a project nor its designation as an economic security zone automatically resolves these requirements. 

The environmental uncertainty likewise remains consequential. At an August congressional hearing, environment officials stated that no Pax Silica-specific environmental impact assessment had yet been applied for or processed because the industrial activities and prospective occupants had not been sufficiently defined. The broader New Clark City development plan possessed environmental documentation, but the effects of individual mineral-processing or manufacturing facilities require assessment according to their actual technologies and operations. 

For agricultural communities, questions about water, electricity and land use are not peripheral matters to be settled after investment decisions have been made. They concern the material conditions of rural production. The capacity to mobilize substantial resources for advanced industrial facilities must be considered alongside the continuing deficiencies in irrigation, farm machinery, transportation and agricultural infrastructure. 

The modernization of agriculture and the development of manufacturing should not be treated as competing objectives. A more integrated national economy would require industries capable of supplying machinery, fertilizers, processing equipment and transportation systems to rural production. The development of such capabilities would connect agricultural productivity with domestic industrial expansion rather than regarding farming communities primarily as occupants of land whose alternative uses may offer higher commercial returns. 

The larger social question is therefore inseparable from the industrial question. National development cannot be measured solely through the value of investment commitments or the sophistication of technologies installed within designated economic zones. It must also be examined through the productive capabilities created within society and the conditions under which workers, farmers and communities participate in the resulting economy. 

These concerns extend beyond the Philippines to the approaching ASEAN Summit. The association’s contemporary development agenda emphasizes connectivity, technological advancement, investment and inclusive growth. The region has undoubtedly acquired considerable importance within international manufacturing and commerce, but the expansion of trade does not necessarily eliminate inequalities in productive power between its economies and the major industrial states. 

Inclusiveness becomes a limited concept when it refers primarily to the participation of more countries and enterprises in international markets. Workers may become participants in advanced production without acquiring greater control over their working conditions or the technologies employed. Developing economies may become valuable locations for strategic supply chains while remaining dependent upon foreign industrial systems. Rural communities may find themselves affected by projects whose economic justification originates in international investment priorities. 

The historical aspirations associated with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the Group of 77 and the Non-Aligned Movement provide a different perspective. During the decades following decolonization, developing countries argued that political independence had not eliminated their dependence upon the advanced industrial powers. They sought changes in the organization of international trade, technology, finance and the control of natural resources. 

These demands acquired a comprehensive expression in the 1974 Declaration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order. The program emphasized permanent sovereignty over natural resources, industrial development, technology transfer and the regulation of transnational corporations. It also called for expanded productive capacities in developing countries, including facilities capable of transforming raw materials closer to their sources. 

The significance of this earlier movement lies in its recognition that the international division of labor was not a neutral or permanent arrangement. Developing countries sought to alter the productive relationships through which their resources entered the industrial economies of more powerful states. Their demands were concerned with economic authority as much as participation in commerce. 

ASEAN emerged from a different historical setting, but its 1971 aspiration for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality likewise reflected concern over the influence of outside powers upon Southeast Asian affairs. The organization was not a regional extension of the Non-Aligned Movement, and its member states maintained differing political and security relationships. Nevertheless, its declared commitment to regional autonomy raises questions about the material conditions necessary to sustain that autonomy. 

The contemporary rivalry between Washington and Beijing has made those questions more urgent. Southeast Asia has become an important location for critical minerals, strategic manufacturing, maritime commerce and security cooperation. Its governments seek to maintain regional centrality while external powers organize economic and military relationships according to their own interests. 

Historical comparisons with the Monroe and Brezhnev doctrines must be employed carefully, for their origins and applications were markedly different. Yet both became associated with forms of great-power predominance in which smaller states confronted limitations upon their independent political choices. The contemporary predicament of ASEAN is not the literal restoration of either doctrine, but the possibility that economic dependency and strategic alignment may constrain national autonomy despite the formal sovereignty of its members. 

The problem is particularly evident when industrial development becomes dependent upon participation in the strategic supply chains of competing powers. The region may retain diplomatic room for maneuver while lacking sufficient control over the productive technologies and resources necessary to sustain independent economic decisions. 

The older demands for economic sovereignty consequently remain relevant, although their realization would require more than the revival of historical declarations. They point toward the development of productive institutions capable of utilizing natural resources, capital, labor and scientific knowledge according to national and regional requirements. 

For the Philippines, such a program would involve sustained investment in domestic machinery manufacturing, metallurgy, industrial chemicals, energy systems, electrical equipment, transportation and technological research. It would also require closer relationships between industrial enterprises, public laboratories, universities and the needs of agriculture and manufacturing. 

Foreign capital could participate in these activities, but its commercial priorities could not substitute for a national industrial direction. The central responsibility of economic policy would be the development of productive capabilities that can be employed, maintained and expanded within the country, rather than principally the attraction of enterprises whose strategic decisions are determined elsewhere. 

The challenge is not merely administrative. It concerns the allocation of capital and the economic interests that have benefited from the existing structure of production. A comprehensive industrial program would have to confront the persistent separation between profitable commercial accumulation and the development of nationally rooted manufacturing capabilities. It would also require public institutions capable of financing and coordinating long-term industrial activity without allowing such support to become another source of private privilege. 

The scientific dimension is equally important. The work already undertaken within Philippine universities and public research institutions represents a productive resource that cannot be adequately utilized through the publication of studies alone. It requires industries, financing mechanisms and administrative institutions capable of translating research into technologies employed for national development. 

The findings of PIDS concerning publicly funded agricultural and food technologies demonstrate that this is not simply an abstract ambition. The country already possesses research and technical knowledge whose wider application is constrained by institutional weaknesses. A national program that gives greater attention to the productive use of domestic research would address a deficiency that cannot be corrected merely by importing advanced technologies through foreign investment. 

This is perhaps the most consequential question raised by the enthusiastic presentation of Pax Silica as innovation. The issue is not whether advanced foreign technologies can be employed upon Philippine soil, but whether the country is building the institutions necessary to generate and develop technologies of its own. The establishment of sophisticated facilities may enlarge industrial activity, but it does not necessarily create the scientific, financial and productive relationships through which an independent industrial economy is sustained. 

The denial of a scheduled announcement during the ASEAN Summit has done little to diminish these considerations. The Philippines has already joined Pax Silica, negotiations over the proposed economic security zone continue, and the American government remains committed to securing strategic industrial supply chains. Whether the eventual framework results in substantial manufacturing investments or undergoes further revision, its broader importance must be examined through the productive relations it establishes. 

The controversy therefore reaches beyond the proposed industrial facilities in Tarlac. It concerns an economic development model that has repeatedly identified foreign investment, comparative advantage and participation in international production with modernization, even while the domestic institutions necessary for comprehensive industrialization have remained insufficiently developed. 

For the Philippines and its Southeast Asian neighbors, the question is not simply how much investment the region can attract or how effectively it can contribute to the supply chains of the world’s industrial powers. It concerns whether the wealth created from its resources and labor can become the foundation of more independent productive capabilities, and whether the people whose work sustains economic development can acquire a greater share of its benefits. 

The history of globalization has demonstrated that international participation alone cannot settle these questions. The renewed strategic competition over industrial resources has made them more urgent, not less. Pax Silica may eventually produce advanced factories, but the long-standing question of Philippine industrialization will remain until the country’s scientific knowledge, accumulated capital, natural wealth and productive labor are brought together through institutions capable of directing their development according to the economic and social requirements of its own population.