Carnations and Contradictions:
April 25 and the Unfinished Revolution
On April 25, 1974, a sequence of events unfolded in Portugal that would reverberate across the late twentieth century as one of the last great revolutionary ruptures in Western Europe. Known to history as the Carnation Revolution, this moment marked not merely the overthrow of an authoritarian regime, but the sudden and dramatic opening of a revolutionary situation in which the social, economic, and political foundations of the state were contested from below. What began as a military coup executed by the Armed Forces Movement rapidly transcended its initial parameters, becoming a mass upheaval that exposed the contradictions of Portuguese capitalism, fractured the apparatus of state power, and raised—if only briefly—the question of socialist transformation.
To situate April 25 within its proper historical frame, one must return to the long durée of the Estado Novo, established under António de Oliveira Salazar and continued by his successor Marcelo Caetano. This regime, often described as corporatist-authoritarian, was in fact a rigid system of class domination that fused bureaucratic control with ideological conservatism. It sought to regulate labor through state-sponsored syndicates, suppress dissent through an extensive surveillance apparatus, and maintain social hierarchy under the guise of national unity. Salazar’s oft-cited assertion—“We do not discuss God and virtue; we accept them”—captures the epistemological closure of the regime, a political order that rejected contestation in favor of imposed consensus (Salazar, as cited in Wiarda, 1977).
Yet beneath this façade of stability lay structural fragilities. The Portuguese economy, though experiencing periods of growth in the 1960s, remained dependent on low wages, limited industrial diversification, and the outflow of labor through emigration. As scholars have noted, this so-called “economic miracle” was sustained by what can only be described as systemic underdevelopment—an accumulation model that privileged industrial-financial conglomerates while marginalizing the working population (Maxwell, 1995). The concentration of wealth in elite families such as the Mellos and Espírito Santo group underscored the oligarchic character of the regime.
The most acute contradiction, however, emerged in the form of colonial war. Beginning in 1961, Portugal engaged in prolonged military conflicts in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. Unlike other European powers that transitioned toward indirect forms of imperial influence, Portugal persisted in direct colonial domination, deploying military force against national liberation movements. This decision was not merely ideological but structural: Portuguese capitalism, lacking the flexibility of its counterparts, depended on colonial extraction to sustain itself. As Amílcar Cabral incisively observed, “Portugal is not a colonial power like the others; it is a colony of its colonies” (Cabral, 1973). The wars thus became both a material drain and a political crisis, exposing the limits of the regime’s capacity to reproduce itself.
It was within this context that the Armed Forces Movement emerged. Composed largely of mid-ranking officers—captains and majors drawn from petty-bourgeois and working-class backgrounds—the Movement was initially motivated by professional grievances. The promulgation of Decree Law 353/73, which allowed militia officers to bypass career ranks, catalyzed dissatisfaction within the officer corps. Yet as historical analysis suggests, such grievances served as an entry point into broader political consciousness. The lived experience of colonial warfare—its brutality, futility, and human cost—transformed technical discontent into systemic critique.
Here, the role of the Portuguese Communist Party assumes critical importance. Operating clandestinely under conditions of repression, the Party had developed extensive networks within labor unions, student movements, and segments of the military. Under the leadership of Álvaro Cunhal, the PCP pursued a strategy that linked immediate grievances to structural analysis, reframing the colonial war as an imperialist project contrary to the interests of the Portuguese people. Cunhal’s formulation—that the war was “not a national cause but a war against the people”—articulated a shift from nationalist to class-based interpretation (Cunhal, 1976).
The events of April 25 itself were meticulously coordinated. The signal for the coup—the broadcast of the banned song “Grândola, Vila Morena”—marked the commencement of military operations aimed at seizing strategic points in Lisbon. The efficiency of the operation reflected both planning and the erosion of regime loyalty within the armed forces. Yet the decisive transformation of the coup into a revolution occurred not within barracks but in the streets. Defying instructions to remain indoors, thousands of civilians mobilized, converging upon sites of power and confronting the remnants of the regime.
The symbolic act of placing carnations in soldiers’ rifles has entered the historical imagination as a gesture of peace. However, its deeper significance lies in the dissolution of the boundary between military and civilian spheres. In theoretical terms, this moment represents a fracture within the coercive apparatus of the state. As Vladimir Lenin argued, the stability of any state depends upon the cohesion of its repressive organs; when these organs fragment, the conditions for revolutionary transformation emerge (Lenin, 1917). The fraternization observed in Lisbon thus marked not merely a symbolic reconciliation but a structural rupture.
The aftermath of April 25 gave rise to the Processo Revolucionário Em Curso, a protracted period characterized by intense class struggle and institutional instability. The collapse of the dictatorship created a vacuum in which competing forms of power coexisted. On one hand, provisional governments sought to establish a framework for liberal democracy. On the other, grassroots organizations—workers’ commissions, neighborhood assemblies, and peasant collectives—asserted direct control over economic and social life.
This phenomenon, often described as “dual power,” reflects a classical revolutionary situation in which the legitimacy of the state is contested by emergent forms of popular authority (Lenin, 1917). Across industrial sectors, workers occupied factories, removed management, and instituted collective decision-making structures. In rural areas, particularly in the Alentejo, land occupations dismantled the latifundia system, redistributing agricultural production under cooperative models. These developments were not centrally orchestrated but arose from the spontaneous initiative of the masses, demonstrating what Marxist theory identifies as the creative capacity of the working class in revolutionary conditions.
The state, responding to these pressures, enacted a series of nationalizations in 1975, encompassing banking, insurance, and key industries. While these measures aligned partially with the programmatic objectives of the PCP, they also exceeded them, indicating the extent to which mass mobilization drove policy beyond institutional frameworks. As one observer noted, the revolution “moved faster than any party could anticipate” (Maxwell, 1995).
Nevertheless, the revolutionary process was neither uncontested nor unidirectional. Conservative forces, both domestic and international, mobilized to contain the upheaval. NATO and Western governments viewed developments in Portugal with concern, given its strategic position. Internally, right-wing groups engaged in acts of sabotage and political violence, seeking to destabilize the revolutionary movement.
Within the revolutionary camp, strategic divergences emerged. The PCP emphasized a gradualist approach, advocating alliances with progressive military elements and cautioning against premature confrontation. In contrast, far-left groups prioritized the expansion of autonomous workers’ power, often criticizing the Party’s institutional orientation. This tension between organizational discipline and grassroots spontaneity became a defining feature of the period.
The attempted coup of March 11, 1975, led by António de Spínola, represented a critical juncture. Its failure, due in part to mass mobilization, temporarily strengthened revolutionary forces. However, the subsequent months revealed the fragility of the process. The events of November 25, 1975, in which moderate military elements reasserted control, marked the effective end of the revolutionary phase. The dismantling of radical structures and the consolidation of parliamentary democracy signaled a reconfiguration rather than a complete rupture of state power.
In the years that followed, Portugal underwent political stabilization and economic integration into the European Economic Community. While these developments are often framed as successes, they also entailed the rollback of many revolutionary gains. Land reforms were reversed, nationalized industries restructured, and grassroots institutions dissolved or marginalized. The revolutionary potential of April 25 was thus contained within the parameters of a reconstituted capitalist order.
Yet the historical significance of the Carnation Revolution cannot be reduced to its outcome. It remains a critical case study in the dynamics of revolutionary change within advanced capitalist societies. It demonstrates the centrality of the armed forces as both instrument and potential site of rupture. It underscores the importance of political organization, particularly the role of parties capable of articulating and sustaining mass movements. At the same time, it reveals the limitations of strategies that seek to mediate between revolutionary transformation and institutional continuity.
As Álvaro Cunhal later reflected, “the revolution was not defeated in its essence; it was interrupted in its development” (Cunhal, 1976). This characterization invites a reconsideration of April 25 not as a closed chapter but as an open question—an episode whose lessons remain relevant for contemporary struggles.
In the final analysis, the Carnation Revolution stands as both achievement and warning. It affirms the capacity of collective action to dismantle entrenched systems of domination, while simultaneously illustrating the complexities of sustaining revolutionary momentum in the face of internal divisions and external pressures. The carnations placed in rifle barrels symbolized a moment of unity and possibility; their fading reminds us that such moments are contingent, requiring not only courage but continuity.
***
References (APA Style)
Arendt, H. (1963). Eichmann in Jerusalem: A report on the banality of evil. Viking Press.
Cabral, A. (1973). Return to the source: Selected speeches. Monthly Review Press.
Cunhal, Á. (1976). The Portuguese revolution: Past and future. Editions Avante.
Lenin, V. I. (1917). State and revolution. Progress Publishers.
Maxwell, K. (1995). The making of Portuguese democracy. Cambridge University Press.
Wiarda, H. J. (1977). Corporatism and development: The Portuguese experience. University of Massachusetts Press.