To Harness or to Disarm the Machine:
On the use of Artificial Intelligence,
Neoliberal interpretations of Freedom,
and the Forgotten Social Encyclicals
in Pursuit of a Magnificent Person
Neoliberal interpretations of Freedom,
and the Forgotten Social Encyclicals
in Pursuit of a Magnificent Person
Artificial intelligence has entered public life not merely as a technical instrument but as an anthropological question. Like the plough, the printing press, the steam engine, the factory line, the atomic reactor and the computer before it, AI forces society to ask not only what the machine can do, but what the machine may make of the human person if technological power is separated from moral judgment.
Drawing from Pope Leo XIV’s Magnifica Humanitas, the Vatican’s Antiqua et Nova, and the Catholic social tradition from Rerum Novarum to Laborem Exercens, Gaudium et Spes and Caritas in Veritate, this article argues that the proper question is not whether humanity should use the machine, since it already does, but whether the human person will harness the machine or submit to it. It further argues that the Vatican’s language of “disarmament” should not be read as a rejection of AI itself, but as a call to strip technical power of its false sovereignty.
In an age when neoliberal capitalism often disguises domination through the language of freedom, initiative, choice and personal responsibility, the Church’s social encyclicals must be read not as decorative literature but as instruments of social judgment. The article concludes that AI must be harnessed because man is called to work, build and govern; it must be disarmed because fallen systems will use technology to dominate while calling domination freedom.
When the Machine Becomes a Question
There are moments in history when a machine ceases to be merely an instrument and becomes a question. The plough was such a question. So was the press, the steam engine, the telegraph, the factory line, the atomic reactor, the computer and now artificial intelligence. Each arrived first as a practical device, promising speed, power, reach, convenience and profit. Yet each soon forced society to ask a larger question: not simply what the machine can do, but what the machine will make of man if man forgets what he is.
Artificial intelligence has now brought modern society to such a moment. It drafts correspondence, summarizes reports, designs images, filters applications, translates documents, recommends medical decisions, predicts consumer behavior, supports military planning, detects financial anomalies, imitates literary style and reorganizes office work. It has entered the school, the boardroom, the newsroom, the government bureau, the parish office, the campaign room and the home.
This is why the present debate over artificial intelligence cannot be left to engineers, investors, regulators or futurists alone. It belongs also to philosophers, theologians, workers, teachers, parents, executives, statesmen and citizens. AI is not only a productivity tool. It is a civilizational test. Properly governed, it may become one of the great instruments by which human intelligence extends its reach. Improperly worshipped, it may become another mechanism by which man is reduced to function, preference, labor cost, data and appetite.
The central question is therefore simple but severe: shall the person harness the machine, or shall the person submit to it?
To harness is to command, direct, discipline and subordinate. To submit is to abdicate. A society that harnesses artificial intelligence places it under conscience, law, education, labor dignity, democratic oversight and the common good. A society that submits to artificial intelligence allows the machine — or, more precisely, those who own, finance and deploy the machine — to define efficiency as destiny.
This article argues that artificial intelligence should be understood neither as idol nor demon, neither salvation nor apocalypse. It is a machine: powerful, disruptive, useful, dangerous and subordinate. The real crisis is not in the circuit. It is in the anthropology of the user, the corporation, the school, the state and the market order into which the machine is inserted.
I. Magnifica Humanitas and the New Social Question
Pope Leo XIV’s Magnifica Humanitas, signed on May 15, 2026, the 135th anniversary of Leo XIII’s Rerum Novarum, enters directly into the tradition of Catholic social discernment. The Holy See presented the encyclical as a document “on safeguarding the human person in the time of Artificial Intelligence,” explicitly linking the AI question to the Church’s older engagement with industrial capitalism and labor. The Vatican Press Office noted that the encyclical was signed on the anniversary of Rerum Novarum, making the historical connection unmistakable.
The title itself is significant. Magnifica Humanitas does not speak first of digital systems, regulatory standards or computational capacity. It speaks of humanity, and more specifically of the human person. The Vatican’s official text frames the document around the “res novae of our time,” “building for the common good” and “remaining human.”
This framing matters. In the encyclical’s logic, artificial intelligence is not merely a technical breakthrough. It is one of the “new things” that compels moral interpretation. The machine appears as novelty, but the moral question is old: what becomes of the person when power grows faster than wisdom?
The answer offered by Magnifica Humanitas is neither technophobic nor naive. The encyclical does not present technology as inherently hostile to humanity. Rather, it treats technology as morally consequential because it bears the imprint of those who design, finance, regulate and use it. The document’s concern is not that man has invented a tool, but that technical power may claim the right to govern humanity.
At the presentation of the encyclical, Leo XIV warned that artificial intelligence already affects decisions shaping human coexistence and even the conduct of war. The Vatican Press Office reported his concern that algorithms, when fed by data marked by prejudice and injustice, may obstruct access to health care, employment and security.
A machine may classify. It cannot answer for justice.
A machine may predict. It cannot repent.
A machine may generate language. It cannot bear witness.
A machine may imitate prudence. It cannot possess conscience.
The fear is not that a machine has acquired a soul. The fear is that human institutions will hide behind machine outputs to avoid moral responsibility. The algorithm did not decide; the institution did. The model did not exclude; the employer, insurer, platform, agency or state chose to treat its output as authority. The danger of AI is therefore not merely artificial intelligence. It is artificial irresponsibility.
II. From Rerum Novarum to Artificial Intelligence
The deliberate connection between Magnifica Humanitas and Rerum Novarum is substantive, not ceremonial. In 1891, Leo XIII addressed a world remade by industrial capitalism. He confronted the changed relation between capital and labor, the rise of new economic power and the social instability created by industrial modernity. In Rerum Novarum, Leo XIII famously states that “capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital,” a formulation that refuses both class warfare and economic absolutism (Leo XIII, 1891).
The AI question continues that older labor question under new conditions. In the nineteenth century, society had to ask whether the worker would become an appendage of the factory. In the twenty-first century, it must ask whether the person will become an appendage of the system: a data profile, a workflow element, a prompt operator, a behavioral prediction, a replaceable node in an automated network.
John Paul II sharpened the labor question in Laborem Exercens by placing work within a personalist anthropology. The encyclical was issued “on the eve of new developments in technological, economic and political conditions” that, according to many experts, would influence work and production “no less than the industrial revolution of the last century” (John Paul II, 1981).
That description fits the AI age with striking force.
If work is merely output, AI may replace the worker wherever output can be simulated. If work is personal action, social participation, responsibility, discipline, creativity and service, then AI must be judged by whether it elevates or diminishes the worker as a person. The economic issue cannot be separated from the anthropological issue.
This is why the language of the “person” becomes crucial. The modern economy prefers the “individual,” because the individual can be counted, priced, targeted, segmented, surveyed and sold to. Bureaucracy prefers the “case.” Technology prefers the “user.” Politics prefers the “voter.” But Catholic social thought insists on the person: embodied, relational, moral, spiritual, historical and answerable before God.
The individual consumes, votes, clicks, borrows, purchases, competes and exits. The person remembers, promises, suffers, forgives, creates, worships, learns, inherits and builds. The person is not merely a unit of preference. The person is a moral being whose freedom is not reducible to choice and whose dignity is not earned by productivity.
Gaudium et Spes supplies the deeper theological anthropology. The Second Vatican Council placed the Church’s social reflection within the concrete conditions of the modern world and treated the human person as the center of social concern (Second Vatican Council, 1965). Benedict XVI’s Caritas in Veritate continued this line by insisting that social doctrine revolves around “charity in truth,” a principle that must take practical form in moral action (Benedict XVI, 2009).
Thus the AI debate cannot be reduced to jobs, privacy, misinformation or regulation, though all are important. It is about anthropology. What is a human being? Is he a processor? A consumer? A biological platform? A replaceable node in a network? Or is he a person whose dignity precedes both market valuation and machine measurement?
A civilization that cannot answer this question will not govern AI. It will be governed by it.
III. Efficiency as Servant, Efficiency as Metaphysics
The modern economy will be tempted to answer the AI question in the wrong way. Markets admire speed, scale, measurability, repeatability and cost reduction. Bureaucracies admire process. Political campaigns admire manipulation of attention. Corporations admire anything that transforms uncertainty into manageable prediction. In such an environment, artificial intelligence will be welcomed first not as a moral instrument, but as an instrument of efficiency.
Efficiency is not evil. No serious civilization can despise it. Waste is not holiness. Delay is not wisdom. A farmer who refuses a better plough does not thereby become more human; he merely becomes less productive. A hospital that refuses digital tools does not thereby become more compassionate; it may simply become slower, more expensive and less accurate. A school that refuses technology entirely may not be defending the mind; it may be denying students the language of their age.
The problem begins when efficiency becomes metaphysics. Once speed is treated as wisdom, automation as progress and output as truth, the machine begins to dictate the meaning of human life. The person is then no longer the subject who uses the tool; he becomes the object being optimized by the system.
This danger is particularly acute in business. A firm that uses AI to eliminate needless drudgery, improve safety, detect waste, support workers and free human judgment for higher tasks has harnessed the machine. A firm that uses AI merely to reduce headcount, surveil employees, manipulate customers or avoid responsibility has submitted to the machine, even if profits rise.
A company may automate reports, but it cannot automate honor. It may optimize workflow, but it cannot outsource prudence. It may predict customer behavior, but it cannot generate legitimacy by algorithmic command. It may reduce friction, but it cannot create trust merely by increasing speed.
The great business question of the AI age is therefore not simply: how many jobs can be automated? It is: what kind of worker, manager, entrepreneur and citizen will remain after automation has done its work?
If the answer is a passive operator dependent on machine suggestions, then AI has degraded the firm. If the answer is a more capable person, freed from drudgery and trained for higher judgment, then AI has served enterprise well.
IV. Market Submission and Sterile Reaction
The doctrine of the person cuts against two opposing errors.
- The first error is market submission. It says: the machine has arrived; therefore society must adapt to it. If AI lowers costs, reduces employees, accelerates production, predicts consumers and reorganizes white-collar work, then resistance is inefficient. In this view, the human person becomes an adjustable variable in the model. Employment, education, attention, privacy and even truth are subordinated to technical and commercial advantage.
This error is powerful because it clothes itself in realism. It says that one must deal with the world as it is. It says markets are not sentimental, competition is unforgiving and delay is suicide. Much of this is true as description. It becomes false as doctrine. To recognize market pressure is prudence. To accept market pressure as moral law is idolatry.
- The second error is sterile reaction. It says: the machine has arrived; therefore society must denounce it. This view may speak piously about the soul, sin, obedience and revealed truth, but it often refuses to engage the actual conditions under which modern persons live. It can mistake nostalgia for orthodoxy and hardship for virtue. It can romanticize older forms of life not because they were holier, but because they were less technically mediated.
In this form, even religious language may become evasive. It may speak of the soul while ignoring the economy that forms habits, the school that forms thought, the media system that forms attention and the workplace that forms character. It may dismiss language such as humanitas as modernist ornament while failing to see that the human person is central to Christian doctrine.
Both errors fail because both refuse governance. The first refuses moral governance. The second refuses historical governance. The first kneels before the market. The second flees into an imagined past. Neither forms the magnificent person required by the present age.
A more serious view begins with historical realism. It recognizes that machinery is already present. It recognizes that AI will not be uninvented. It recognizes that institutions, workers, schools and states must learn to act within this changed environment. But it also insists that adaptation is not submission. To govern is neither to worship nor to flee. It is to command.
V. Neoliberal Freedom and the Soft Tyranny of Choice
There is another reason the Church’s language of disarmament may sound unsatisfactory to the concerned person. In an age when neoliberal capitalism struggles to maintain its foothold, the vocabulary of human dignity is often seized by the very order that diminishes it. Words such as freedom, initiative, liberty, choice, responsibility and even frailty are interpreted in a hyperindividualist manner until they become masks for a subtler tyranny.
The market order says: the individual is free because he chooses. He is responsible because he bears the outcome. He has initiative because he competes. He has liberty because no one formally coerces him. He is frail because he is human, and therefore the system’s injuries may be sentimentalized as the inevitable cost of life.
Under this grammar, even suffering can be privatized. If the worker is exhausted, he must become more resilient. If the poor are excluded, they must become more enterprising. If the citizen is manipulated, he must become more discerning. If the machine displaces labor, the displaced must reskill, adapt and remain optimistic.
This is where a sinister inversion occurs. The system wounds the person and then says: this is merely human life. It calls competition freedom, insecurity initiative, precarity flexibility, isolation choice and exhaustion responsibility. The person is told he is free while being trained to accept conditions he did not choose and cannot meaningfully govern.
For this reason, the social encyclicals cannot be treated as decorative ecclesiastical literature. They are not pious ornaments placed beside the market. They comprise a social outlook: a moral reading of economy, labor, property, technology, development, power and the human person.
- Rerum Novarum did not merely advise workers to be good within industrial capitalism; it placed capital and labor under moral judgment.
- Laborem Exercens did not reduce Christianity to private virtue inside economic necessity; it treated technological and economic change as a challenge to the dignity of work.
- Caritas in Veritate did not treat development as mere expansion; it placed development under truth and charity.
- Antiqua et Nova and Magnifica Humanitas now carry that tradition into the age of artificial intelligence, asking whether technology will serve human dignity or reorganize the person according to the logic of systems.
The anxious question is therefore justified: what are these encyclicals for if Christians treat them as literature rather than doctrine for social life? What does it mean to profess belief in “one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church” while treating the Church’s social teaching as optional prose? What does it mean to condemn the misuse of machines while accepting the economic order that arms them? What does it mean to praise human dignity while practicing a functional prosperity gospel, in which wealth is read as blessing, poverty as failure, initiative as salvation and the market as providence?
This is the scandal. Many Christians do not reject Catholic social doctrine openly. They domesticate it. They quote it at conferences, admire its balanced tone, file it under “ethics,” and then return to a practical religion of success. They may profess the Creed liturgically while believing, economically, in the prosperity gospel: that the favored rise, the disciplined win, the market rewards virtue and the poor are best helped by becoming more competitive.
In such a world, the encyclicals become beautiful documents with little governing force.
The danger is that Magnifica Humanitas may suffer the same fate. It may be praised as timely, humane and thoughtful, while the actual systems of AI deployment remain governed by profit, speed, military advantage, labor reduction and behavioral capture. The language of the human person may be celebrated, but the person himself may still be measured, scored, replaced and optimized.
This is why the criticism cannot stop at the machine. Artificial intelligence does not appear in a vacuum. It appears inside neoliberal capitalism, platform capitalism, state security systems, consumer psychology and geopolitical rivalry. To complain about AI while leaving these structures untouched is to notice the weapon while ignoring the arsenal. The machine is armed not only by code, but by incentives.
Here, “disarmament” becomes more than a metaphor about technology. It becomes a challenge to the social order that weaponizes technology. To disarm AI is not only to regulate algorithms. It is to question the economic theology that says whatever is profitable, scalable and chosen is therefore legitimate. It is to reject the hyperindividualist distortion of freedom that leaves persons alone before systems too large for them to resist: that liberty without solidarity becomes abandonment. that initiative without justice becomes competition among the wounded. And choice without truthful conditions becomes managed consent.
VI. Why “Disarmament” and Not Merely “Harnessing”?
It is not accidental that Magnifica Humanitas reaches for the word “disarmament” rather than relying only on the milder language of harnessing. To harness a machine is to govern it, direct it and subordinate it to human purpose. That remains necessary. But disarmament goes further. It suggests that artificial intelligence is not merely a neutral tool waiting to be placed in good hands. It has already entered logics of rivalry, domination, exclusion, surveillance, commercial capture and war.
At the presentation of Magnifica Humanitas, Leo XIV said that “artificial intelligence needs to be disarmed.” He acknowledged that “disarm” is a strong word, but described it as necessary to awaken conscience and indicate a path.
This explains why disarmament carries more moral weight than harnessing. Harnessing assumes that the machine is powerful and must be guided. Disarmament assumes that the machine has already been placed inside structures of conflict. It is not merely a plough waiting for the farmer. It is also a weapon, a market instrument, a surveillance device, a political amplifier and a tool of institutional sorting.
The problem is not only what AI can do. The problem is what kind of social order is already forming around it.
The word also reveals the Church’s view of the human person. It is not because the Church despises human effort. On the contrary, Catholic social teaching has consistently honored labor, reason, craft, invention and the responsible development of earthly life. From Rerum Novarum to Laborem Exercens, work is treated as a field of dignity, not as a punishment to be escaped. The person is meant to cultivate, build, govern and create.
But disarmament also recognizes human fragility. Man is not only creative; he is also tempted. He can turn intelligence into domination, efficiency into exploitation, knowledge into control and invention into violence. The machine magnifies not only human reason but also human disorder. A society that builds AI without moral discipline may not become more enlightened. It may simply become more efficient in its injustices.
This is why disarmament must be read spiritually and politically. It does not mean dismantling all technology. It means stripping AI of its false claim to mastery. It means freeing technology from the systems that make it an instrument of domination while calling domination progress.
Harnessing names the positive task: commanding the machine for the sake of human flourishing.
Disarmament names the negative and spiritual task: stripping the machine of its false claim to mastery, and stripping humanity of the illusion that technical power can overcome the woundedness of the human condition.
Together, they form a fuller ethic. The person must harness the machine because man is called to work, build and govern. The person must also disarm the machine because humanity is fragile, fallen and tempted to make idols out of his own inventions.
VII. Why “Disarmament” Can Be Misread
The language of disarmament is powerful precisely because it is dangerous. It can be misunderstood. Readers who take the word verbatim, or technically, may assume that the Vatican is calling for artificial intelligence itself to be disavowed, dismantled or treated as an enemy of man. In that reading, disarmament sounds less like moral governance and more like renunciation: as though the Church were asking humanity to step away from the machine entirely.
That would be too narrow a reading. The intent of Magnifica Humanitas is not to deny the reality of artificial intelligence, nor to pretend that modern society can simply uninvent it. The Holy See presented the encyclical as a response to AI’s real social power, not as a fantasy of retreat. Its concern is that AI be disarmed from logics of domination, exclusion and war, and placed at the service of human dignity, solidarity and the common good.
In that sense, disarmament does not mean the destruction of the tool. It means the dethronement of the tool. It means preventing technical power from claiming the right to govern humanity.
Artificial intelligence will not, in its actuality, become sovereign unless human beings and institutions grant it that sovereignty. The machine does not rule by itself. It rules when executives, states, schools, militaries, courts, employers and citizens hide behind it, obey it uncritically or allow it to define what counts as efficient, rational, normal and necessary.
The more practical language remains harnessing. Humanity has to harness the machine rather than submit to it. AI must be commanded, disciplined and subordinated to human judgment. It must assist thought without replacing conscience. It must aid production without defining the value of labor. It must support governance without becoming government. It must extend human intelligence without pretending to become wisdom.
But there is also a deeper, almost eschatological resonance in the word disarmament. It suggests that humanity must remember its fragility. The Church’s warning is not only that machines may become too powerful. It is that human beings, being fallen, tempted and finite, may place too much of themselves into the machine. They may pour into AI not only intelligence, but pride, domination, fear, greed, rivalry and the old lust for control.
In this sense, the machine becomes a mirror. It reflects not only human brilliance, but human woundedness. The same intelligence that can use AI to cure disease, organize knowledge, educate the poor and reduce drudgery can also use it to automate prejudice, manipulate voters, replace workers without responsibility, intensify war and concentrate power.
The fragility lies not in humanity’s lack of talent, but in humanity’s lack of perfection.
VIII. The Sentimentality of Hardship
The language of disarmament carries another danger: it may sound, to impatient modern ears, like a sanctification of difficulty. It may be heard as though the Church were telling humanity to endure mental math rather than use the calculator, to prefer the ledger over the spreadsheet, to honor the quill over the typewriter, to defend the knight after gunpowder had already changed the battlefield.
This is not a trivial misunderstanding. Much opposition to technology has often hidden itself inside a sentimental defense of older disciplines. The older way feels more human because it required visible effort. The clerk’s hand moved across the ledger. The student solved the equation unaided. The craftsman shaped the object by touch. The knight mastered horse, sword, armor and ritual. These forms of labor had dignity, and their disappearance should not be mocked. A civilization that laughs at all older disciplines becomes shallow.
But it is equally shallow to confuse difficulty with dignity. Man is not made more human merely because a task is harder. Waste is not holiness. Delay is not wisdom. A farmer who refuses the plough is not defending the soul of agriculture; he is making hunger more likely. A hospital that refuses digital diagnostics is not defending compassion; it may be endangering patients. A student who never learns mental discipline becomes weaker, but a student who is forbidden every tool becomes artificially constrained.
The same applies to artificial intelligence. The purpose of human formation is not to preserve every burden. It is to form judgment.
Mental math may train the mind, but the calculator has its place. Handwriting may discipline attention, but the typewriter and computer have their place. Memorization may strengthen the intellect, but reference tools have their place. The moral question is not whether the tool reduces effort. The moral question is whether it reduces the person.
The analogy of the knight and gunpowder remains useful. Those who mourned the knight were not entirely wrong. Gunpowder did end something: an older world of personal combat, aristocratic military identity and visible martial discipline. But history did not stop because the knight lost his centrality. Courage did not disappear. Duty did not disappear. Strategy did not disappear. They moved onto another field.
So too with artificial intelligence. AI may end certain older forms of intellectual labor. It may weaken the prestige of routine writing, routine calculation, routine drafting and routine analysis. Some will mourn this, and not without reason. But the task is not to preserve every older burden as though burden itself were sacred. The task is to move human dignity to the new field: judgment, conscience, interpretation, responsibility, creativity and wisdom.
The Church’s warning, therefore, should not be read as a demand that person to reject the machine in order to prove one's humanity. It should be read as a demand that person not allow the machine to define one's own humanity.
The problem is not about that person who uses a calculator. The problem is when that person no longer understands number, relation, proportion or truth. The problem is not that that person who uses AI to draft, organize or summarize. The problem is when that person can no longer think without permission from the machine.
The magnificent person is not the person who refuses assistance. He is the person who remains master of assisted action. That person may use the calculator, but should still know what calculation means. That person may use the spreadsheet, but should still understand judgment. That person may use AI, but should still possess thought. And that person may harness the machine, but must not become intellectually disarmed before it.
IX. AI, Business and the Efficient Dependent
The business world has particular reason to take this argument seriously. Artificial intelligence will be sold to firms in the language of efficiency: faster reports, lower headcount, better targeting, smoother logistics, automated customer service, predictive compliance and reduced uncertainty. Many of these uses may be legitimate. Efficiency is not the enemy of human dignity. A wasteful enterprise is not thereby more humane.
Yet the corporation that treats AI merely as a labor-reduction device may hollow out the very human capacities that sustain enterprise: judgment, loyalty, trust, tacit knowledge, institutional memory, negotiation, prudence and moral responsibility.
The proper business question is therefore not only: how many functions can be automated? It is: what kind of worker, manager and citizen remains after automation has done its work?
If the answer is a passive operator dependent on machine suggestions, then AI has degraded the firm. If the answer is a more capable person, freed from drudgery and trained for higher judgment, then AI has served enterprise well.
This distinction recalls Rerum Novarum. Leo XIII confronted industrial capitalism not by rejecting industry, but by placing capital and labor under moral judgment. The industrial worker was not merely a cost. The AI-era worker is not merely an inefficiency waiting to be optimized away. The worker remains a person, and the workplace remains a moral community even when mediated by software.
Here, the distinction between hardship and dignity returns. It is not necessary to preserve every older task in order to preserve labor dignity. Many tedious tasks should be automated. But when automation becomes a pretext for treating persons as disposable, the machine has not served work. It has degraded it.
The business culture that harnesses AI will use it to elevate human responsibility. The business culture that submits to AI will use it to manufacture efficient dependents.
X. Education: Mental Math, Calculators, and the Discipline of Judgment
The example of mental math is useful because it shows both sides of the problem. A student who never learns arithmetic discipline may become dependent on the calculator in a shallow way. He may get answers without understanding proportion, relation, estimation or error. In that case, the tool has weakened him. But a student forbidden to use any calculator, even after learning mathematical principles, is not necessarily more intelligent. He may simply be made slower. The tool becomes dangerous only when it replaces understanding rather than serving it.
The same applies to AI in education. A student who uses AI to avoid reading, writing and reasoning becomes weaker. A student who uses AI to test an argument, compare sources, clarify structure, identify counterarguments and revise prose may become stronger, provided he still owns the judgment. The aim is not unaided exertion for its own sake. The aim is formed intelligence.
The Vatican’s Antiqua et Nova is important precisely because it frames the matter as a relationship between artificial intelligence and human intelligence. It does not treat AI as an isolated technical phenomenon, but as a development that must be understood in light of human wisdom, responsibility and truth.
The school that merely bans AI may produce resentment and evasion. The school that merely adopts AI may produce dependency. The school that forms judgment may produce persons who can use machines without surrendering thought.
XI. The Social Encyclicals as Judgment, Not Literature
The social encyclicals must be revisited not as museum texts, but as instruments of judgment. Rerum Novarum asks whether labor is being dignified or consumed.
Laborem Exercens asks whether work remains personal or becomes merely functional. Caritas in Veritate asks whether development serves truth or merely expansion. Gaudium et Spes asks whether earthly affairs remain ordered to the human person and the common good. Antiqua et Nova asks whether artificial intelligence is being understood in relation to human intelligence, wisdom and responsibility. Magnifica Humanitas asks whether humanity will remain profoundly human when technical systems become powerful enough to imitate, classify and command.
Laborem Exercens asks whether work remains personal or becomes merely functional. Caritas in Veritate asks whether development serves truth or merely expansion. Gaudium et Spes asks whether earthly affairs remain ordered to the human person and the common good. Antiqua et Nova asks whether artificial intelligence is being understood in relation to human intelligence, wisdom and responsibility. Magnifica Humanitas asks whether humanity will remain profoundly human when technical systems become powerful enough to imitate, classify and command.
If Christians read these documents but continue to live by the prosperity gospel, then the problem is not that the Church has failed to speak. The problem is that its people have preferred a more convenient creed. The official creed says one thing. The practical creed says another. The lips say “one, holy, catholic and apostolic Church.” The habits say: efficiency, success, visibility, wealth, self-optimization and market reward.
That contradiction matters in the AI age because the machine will magnify whatever anthropology it receives. If it receives Catholic personalism, it may be ordered toward dignity, solidarity and the common good. If it receives neoliberal hyperindividualism, it will optimize isolation. If it receives prosperity-gospel capitalism, it will classify the successful as deserving and the displaced as deficient. If it receives state militarism, it will accelerate domination. If it receives consumer nihilism, it will multiply appetite.
The Church’s social encyclicals therefore do not merely tell Christians to “be good” inside whatever system happens to exist. At their strongest, they deny that any system may define the human person apart from truth. They do not offer a party platform, but they do offer an alternative moral imagination. They refuse the market’s claim to be providence, the state’s claim to be salvation and the machine’s claim to be wisdom.
That is why the AI debate must return to social doctrine. Not because the encyclicals contain software policy in advance, but because they preserve the question the machine cannot answer: what is the person for?
Without that question, disarmament becomes a slogan and harnessing becomes a management technique. With that question, both become moral disciplines. AI must be harnessed because human beings are called to work, build and govern. AI must be disarmed because fallen systems will use it to dominate while calling domination freedom.
XII. Fragility and the Other Life
The most provocative reading of disarmament is not technical but theological. It suggests that humanity must see itself as fragile.
Modern technological culture dislikes this message. It prefers mastery, optimization, enhancement and control. It dreams of frictionless systems and predictable behavior. It wants illness managed, death delayed, attention captured, desire anticipated and choice engineered. Artificial intelligence fits naturally into this dream because it promises something close to administrative omniscience: the ability to know, predict and act faster than human beings can.
But Christianity has never treated the human person as perfectible by technique. Man is capable of greatness, but also fallen. He builds cities and idols. He cures and kills. He creates music and weapons. He seeks truth and manufactures lies. He desires communion and domination. The machine amplifies all of this.
This is why disarmament must be read spiritually. It does not mean that human effort is worthless. It means human effort must be placed under humility. The only perfect order is not the machine order. It is not the market order. It is not the bureaucratic order. It is not even the highest earthly civilization. The only perfect order belongs to God, to the life beyond this one.
Such a claim does not devalue earthly work. It prevents earthly work from becoming idolatrous. Hospitals must still heal. Schools must still teach. Businesses must still produce. Governments must still govern. Engineers must still build. Writers must still write. The point is not to despise the city of man, but to remember that the city of man is not the Kingdom of God.
When AI is asked to provide certainty, control, immortality or final judgment, it becomes a false eschatology. It promises in technical form what only grace can fulfill. A civilization that asks AI to save it will become disappointed, manipulated or enslaved. A civilization that uses AI as a tool while remembering that man remains finite may still remain human.
This is the hidden wisdom of disarmament: it tells humanity not merely to control the machine, but to confess that even the controller is fragile.
XIII. The pursuit of a "Magnificent Person"
The pursuit of a magnificent person must become the cultural program of the AI age.
Such a person is not anti-modern. He uses tools. He understands systems. He welcomes genuine productivity. He does not confuse inconvenience with virtue. He does not romanticize drudgery or pretend that older forms of life were automatically holier because they were less mediated by technology.
But neither does he confuse automation with wisdom. He knows that the machine can assist thought but cannot substitute for conscience. It can organize memory but cannot redeem history. It can generate options but cannot define the good. It can improve production but cannot create purpose. It can recommend action but cannot bear responsibility.
The magnificent person is not merely efficient. He is responsible. He is not merely informed. He is formed. He is not merely connected. He is capable of communion. He is not merely productive. He is fruitful.
In the language of business, he knows that technology must be placed in the service of human flourishing. In the language of politics, he understands that power without accountability becomes domination. In the language of education, he knows that skill without wisdom is dangerous. In the language of faith, he knows that man is not saved by his own inventions.
This vision of the person offers an answer to both market submission and sterile reaction. Against the market absolutist, it says that the human being is not a cost center. Against the reactionary, it says that tools are not evil simply because they are new. Against the technocrat, it says that efficiency is not wisdom. Against the sentimentalist, it says that hardship is not holiness.
The magnificent person is capable of command because he is capable of obedience — not obedience to the machine, the market or the crowd, but obedience to truth. His freedom is not the mere multiplication of choices. It is the disciplined capacity to choose the good.
XIV. Toward an Ethic of Harnessing and Disarmament
If artificial intelligence is to be harnessed rather than submitted to, several principles follow.
- First, AI must remain subordinate to human judgment. It may advise, summarize, simulate and recommend, but it must not become the final moral authority. Institutions must make clear who is responsible for decisions shaped by AI.
- Second, AI must serve the dignity of work. It should relieve drudgery where possible, but not treat workers as disposable. Firms should ask whether automation elevates human responsibility or merely transfers wealth and power upward.
- Third, education must be redesigned around judgment. Students must learn how to question machine outputs, verify sources, detect bias, reason ethically and write with ownership. The goal is not to ban the tool but to prevent the collapse of thought into convenience.
- Fourth, public oversight is essential. Systems that affect health care, employment, law enforcement, credit, education and democratic participation require transparency, accountability, appeal mechanisms and independent review.
- Fifth, technological development must include the poor and excluded. If AI becomes a tool only for wealthy firms, powerful states and privileged schools, it will deepen inequality. If it is governed as part of the common good, it may widen access to knowledge, productivity and participation.
- Sixth, AI must be judged by truth. In an age of synthetic media and automated persuasion, the defense of truth becomes a public duty. A society that treats speech as mere content will be conquered by manipulation.
- Seventh, the economic imagination that arms AI must itself be judged. The current Hyperindividualist interpretation of of freedom, initiative and choice must be purified by solidarity, truth and the common good. Otherwise, AI will merely give old tyrannies a new interface.
These principles are not anti-innovation. They are the conditions under which innovation remains humane.
Conclusion: The Machine Must Be Useful, Not Sovereign
Artificial intelligence may help humanity write, diagnose, simulate, design, translate, discover and govern. But it cannot supply the reason why these things should be done. It cannot tell society what kind of future deserves to exist. That question remains with the person.
To harness the machine is to keep technology within a moral order. To disarm the machine is to free it from the armed logics of domination, exclusion, commercial absolutism and war. These are not opposing tasks, instead, they are two sides of the same moral discipline.
The machine, then, is not the only thing that must be disarmed. The economic imagination that arms it must also be judged as the current hyperindividualist interpretations of freedom, initiative, and choice must be purified by solidarity, truth and the common good. Otherwise, AI will merely give old tyrannies a new interface.
The magnificent person cannot be formed by prosperity piety, market fatalism or technological surrender. That person requires a social order that treats the person not as a winner or loser in a private contest, but as a bearer of dignity whose flourishing is inseparable from justice, work, community, truth and God.
The word disarmament may sound, at first hearing, like a call to endure mental math rather than use the calculator, to preserve the knight even after the gun has arrived, or to suffer the old burden merely because it is old, tried, and tested. That reading must be rejected. Human dignity is not proven by refusing tools. The magnificent person is not the person who rejects assistance. He is the person who remains master of assisted action.
He may use the calculator, but he should still know what calculation means. He may use the spreadsheet, but he should still understand judgment.
He may use AI, but he should still possess thought.
The machine has arrived. It will not be uninvented. The task is not to flee it, nor to worship it, but to place it under moral command. Artificial intelligence must be useful, but not sovereign. Powerful, but not ultimate. Intelligent in function, but never treated as wisdom itself.
The magnificent person is therefore not the one who refuses the machine, nor the one who submits to it. He is the one who can take the machine into his hands without allowing it to take possession of his conscience.
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References
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John Paul II. (1981). Laborem exercens. Vatican.
Leo XIII. (1891). Rerum novarum: On capital and labor. Vatican.
Leo XIV. (2025, June 17). Message of the Holy Father to participants in the Second Annual Rome Conference on Artificial Intelligence. Vatican.
Leo XIV. (2025, November 7). Message of the Holy Father to participants in the Builders AI Forum 2025. Holy See Press Office.
Leo XIV. (2026). Magnifica humanitas: On safeguarding the human person in the time of artificial intelligence. Vatican.
Leo XIV. (2026, May 25). Presentation of the encyclical letter “Magnifica Humanitas” of Pope Leo XIV, on safeguarding the human person in the time of Artificial Intelligence. Holy See Press Office.
Second Vatican Council. (1965). Gaudium et spes: Pastoral constitution on the Church in the modern world. Vatican.