Necessariable: Tactical Accommodation and Revolutionary Strategy in Contemporary Socialist States

Necessariable: Tactical Accommodation and Revolutionary Strategy

in Contemporary Socialist States

In the era of late capitalism and renewed multipolarity, socialist states such as China, Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea confront the dilemma of preserving revolutionary objectives while navigating a global system dominated by neoliberal hegemony. This paper proposes and elaborates the concept of necessariable—a theoretical framework to explain the strategic pause, retreat, or accommodation undertaken by socialist movements and states in anticipation of future revolutionary advancement. Drawing from Marxist-Leninist theory, world-systems analysis, and contemporary political developments, this paper argues that while many contemporary socialist states have entered a phase of tactical accommodation, the dialectical moment of renewed socialist construction remains contingent upon material conditions and political will. If properly harnessed, the necessariable scenario can break the cycle of endless accommodation, especially if socialist states adhere to a program in which market adoption becomes the means—rather than the end—for socialism’s eventual construction.

Introduction

In a time marked by the retreat of leftist internationalism and the strategic adaptation of socialist regimes to global market norms, a reassessment of revolutionary theory and praxis is imperative. The survival and persistence of nominally socialist states amid global capitalism invite a critical conceptual inquiry: can tactical retreat be reconciled with revolutionary integrity? This question frames the core theoretical intervention of this paper—the introduction of the term necessariable, denoting the condition in which revolutionary actors engage in tactical accommodation as a necessary yet temporary strategy for preserving long-term transformative goals.

The theoretical utility of necessariable emerges from historical patterns and contemporary exigencies, whereby socialist states deviate from orthodox paths not out of betrayal, but from an understanding of material conditions, geopolitical constraints, and the dialectics of revolutionary survival. Through an examination of the historical lineage of Marxist praxis and its application in the 21st century, this paper situates necessariable as a key analytic for understanding the ambiguous yet intentional strategies employed by contemporary socialist states.

Theoretical Framework: Dialectics of Revolution and Strategic Retreat

Marxist theory has long grappled with the question of tactical adaptation. In Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder, Lenin emphasized the necessity of compromising with reality to preserve the revolutionary vanguard, warning against purist deviations detached from material analysis (Lenin, 1920). Similarly, Antonio Gramsci’s notion of a "war of position" underscored the need for ideological and institutional entrenchment prior to direct revolutionary confrontation (Gramsci, 1971).

The necessariable expands on these concepts by naming the moment in revolutionary strategy when tactical withdrawal becomes a condition of necessity—determined by the global and domestic configuration of forces that make continued confrontation unsustainable. It is not capitulation but a calibrated recalibration.

As Immanuel Wallerstein argues in The Modern World-System, no state exists outside the gravitational pull of the capitalist world-economy (Wallerstein, 1974). Socialist states, therefore, may be compelled into periods of strategic accommodation—without this necessarily signaling the end of their revolutionary potential. Necessariable captures this liminal zone, a dialectical pause that is temporally necessary for future progression.

China and Vietnam: Pragmatism or Prefiguration?

The transitions of China and Vietnam from command economies to hybrid systems integrating global capitalist mechanisms have sparked intense debate within and beyond the socialist tradition. In China, Deng Xiaoping’s shift toward “socialism with Chinese characteristics” marked a paradigmatic reorientation: the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) retained ideological control while embracing market reforms, foreign direct investment, and eventual accession to the World Trade Organization. This dual-track approach has led many to argue that the revolutionary trajectory has been not only re-routed but possibly abandoned (Harvey, 2005; Hung, 2011).

The shift from collectivization and central planning to “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was justified as a necessary evolution rather than a betrayal of revolutionary ideals. Deng famously declared: “It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice” (Deng, 1962/1994, p. 301). This pragmatism—the hallmark of Deng’s reform agenda—epitomizes necessariable accommodation: a strategic engagement with global capitalism under the justification of developing productive forces to lay the groundwork for a future socialist society.

Yet the CCP continues to assert its commitment to socialism—framing market reforms as tactical moves to strengthen national development, productive capacity, and social stability.

Vietnam followed a comparable path through its Đổi Mới reforms in 1986. By liberalizing its economy while preserving single-party rule, it adopted what might be termed necessariable accommodation—a strategy where engagement with global capitalism is portrayed not as ideological capitulation, but as a pragmatic step necessary to safeguard political sovereignty and eventually fulfill socialist aims. In both cases, the ideological line is carefully managed: the state is said to lead the market, not the reverse- and these reforms are often framed as national development imperatives rather than ideological revisions. However, critics argue that both countries have adopted a form of “state-capitalism” that privileges accumulation over class struggle, and economic growth over socialist transformation (Hung, 2011).

Yet even Mao Zedong, decades prior, had signaled the need for flexibility within socialist construction: “There is no such thing as abstract Marxism, Marxism must be integrated with the concrete conditions of our country” (Mao, 1940/1971). This notion—that Marxism must evolve through local, historical, and material conditions—has been used by reformist leaders to justify transitional compromises. Still, the critical issue remains: are these accommodations part of a long arc toward socialism, or have they crystallized into a new ruling logic?

Giovanni Arrighi (2007) suggests that China, in particular, may be charting a “non-capitalist” developmental path within capitalism itself—leveraging global markets to enhance state sovereignty, redistribute gains internally, and consolidate national cohesion. However, the ambiguity lies in the directionality of these reforms: Are they transitional stages toward a more socialist future, or have they ossified into a new synthesis of authoritarian capitalism? If such accommodations are not explicitly time-bound or tethered to a clear socialist horizon, they risk becoming permanent features of a hybrid system in which the market logic steadily erodes revolutionary purpose.

The dilemma for both China and Vietnam, then, is not whether the state can manage capitalism, but whether the socialist project can survive long-term market entanglement without succumbing to structural capitalist reproduction. The necessariable becomes dangerous when it ceases to be a tactic and is mistaken for a telos.

Cuba: Dialectical Negotiation and Revolutionary Continuity

Cuba offers a more dialectically explicit model of socialist endurance. Despite severe economic hardship—exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ongoing U.S. embargo—Cuba has pursued reforms that open sectors of the economy (e.g. tourism, remittances, and foreign investment) while preserving a strong commitment to the socialist ethos. Unlike China and Vietnam, Cuba’s leadership has consistently presented these reforms as provisional and defensive—measures designed to protect the foundational gains of the revolution in healthcare, education, and popular sovereignty (Mesa-Lago, 2005; Spadoni, 2014).

Fidel Castro consistently emphasized that these reforms were temporary concessions, not a systemic retreat: “We are not reforming the revolution. We are reforming the methods of the revolution... to save socialism, not to bury it.” (Castro, 1994, in Spadoni, 2014). And Cuba's approach reflects a conscious use of necessariable tactics—contingent, ideologically supervised, and always presented as in service of revolutionary survival. Unlike China or Vietnam, Cuba has retained explicit Marxist-Leninist rhetoric as the ideological lens through which reforms are assessed and constrained.

This dialectical maneuvering has allowed Cuba to preserve core welfare institutions (education, healthcare, and public housing) even under extreme material pressure. While criticisms remain—particularly about bureaucratic ossification and generational disengagement—the ideological horizon of socialism remains publicly intact and politically directive.

Here, the necessariable is not a quiet retreat but a dialectical maneuver. Cuba’s strategy affirms that socialist states can engage with capitalist forces without forfeiting their ideological core, provided they maintain strategic clarity and revolutionary discipline. Even economic liberalization is tightly circumscribed by political intent. As such, Cuba demonstrates a unique model of ideological resilience: neither rigid isolation nor unchecked marketization, but a continuous negotiation that seeks to preserve revolutionary integrity while navigating adverse conditions.

Cuba thus exemplifies necessariable tactics guided by revolutionary intentionality—showing that the preservation of socialist structures is possible without wholly capitulating to market logics. The Cuban model suggests that the question is not whether socialist states engage the capitalist world, but how, for what purpose, and with what ideological guardrails.

North Korea: Isolation and the Limits of Rigidity

North Korea stands as a counterpoint to both models. For in contrast to the examples stated, North Korea exemplifies necessariable refusal—a strategy of isolation framed as ideological integrity. Anchored in Juche, its official ideology of self-reliance, North Korea rejected both market reforms and international dependency. As Kim Il Sung proclaimed: “Independence in politics, self-sustenance in the economy, and self-defense in national defense—this is the Juche idea!” (Kim Il Sung, 1974/1979).

What more following the collapse of the USSR, Kim Jong Il sought to reaffirm North Korea’s commitment to socialism in the face of global retreat. His writings emphasize ideological steadfastness and the dangers of 'revisionism': “Our socialism is a socialism of Juche, which embodies the independent idea. It is the most advantageous socialism for the people, the most powerful socialism that defends the independence of the people.” (Kim Jong Il, 1992) 

Thus, Kim Jong Il presented the DPRK’s isolation not as backwardness but as ideological integrity, suggesting that retreat from the global system was necessary for revolutionary preservation, regardless of hardship. While this has allowed the state to maintain rhetorical and institutional consistency with its foundational vision, it has also resulted in severe material deprivation and increasing geopolitical isolation. North Korea’s resistance to liberalization is often framed internally as revolutionary steadfastness, but scholars such as Hazel Smith (2005) have argued that its contemporary politics are more accurately described as post-socialist nationalism, with the survival of the ruling elite outweighing genuine revolutionary renewal.

In this context, the refusal of necessariable engagement has not generated a more robust socialism, but rather an ossified system marked by militarism, dynastic leadership, and limited developmental prospects. North Korea illustrates the perils of equating isolation with ideological purity: absent dialectical adjustment or tactical engagement, a revolutionary project can stagnate, turning inwards and losing its transformative potential.

The North Korean model shows that revolutionary rhetoric without strategic adaptability may uphold form without content. Ideological rigidity, unmediated by material and international realities, risks devolving into mere survivalism.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un’s rhetoric shows selective continuity with his predecessors but has attempted to modernize the image of socialism in the DPRK. His approach is still deeply rooted in Juche, but with greater emphasis on material improvement and limited engagement with global discourse: “We must firmly adhere to our-style socialism, which is based on the great Juche idea... The independent economy is the lifeline of socialism.” (Kim Jong Un, 2017)

But despite modest infrastructural modernization and diplomatic gestures (e.g. the 2018–2019 summits), Kim Jong Un reinforced the primacy of ideology: “Socialism is our life and soul, and the dignity and happiness of our people are unthinkable separated from socialism.” (Kim Jong Un, 2019)

like Kim Jong Il, has also positioned any attempt at reform or liberalization as inherently destabilizing: “We must never tolerate bourgeois ideology and way of life, not even a speck of them, infiltrating into our ranks." (Kim Jong Un, 2020)

Thus, Kim Jong Un's regime maintains the frame of ideological rigidity, even while recognizing the need for improved economic performance. In practice, this continues the tradition of rhetorical resistance to capitalism while offering only highly constrained internal adjustments—no serious necessariable accommodation akin to China, Vietnam, or Cuba.

The Crisis of Global Socialism:
From Comintern to NAM and BRICS

The crisis facing contemporary socialist states is not merely one of internal policy but of geopolitical disarticulation. The collapse of transnational institutions that once unified revolutionary movements has fragmented the socialist project, leaving each state to navigate capitalist pressures with little external support. This structural isolation exacerbates the condition of necessaribility—a strategic pause or retreat forced by the absence of a coherent global socialist alternative.

Historically, socialist advancement was sustained by transnational coordination through structures like the Comintern and COMECON, which attempted to consolidate revolutionary projects into a unified bloc. The Communist International (Comintern), founded in 1919, functioned as a vanguard of global revolution, fostering the growth of communist parties worldwide and coordinating anti-imperialist strategy. According to E.H. Carr, “the Comintern was the instrument through which the Soviet Union sought both to defend itself and to promote revolution abroad” (Carr, 1953). Its dissolution in 1943 reflected a shift toward Soviet diplomatic pragmatism, yet its legacy endured.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON), established in 1949, was designed to institutionalize economic collaboration among socialist states. It operated on non-market principles, relying on bilateral barter, long-term planning, and intra-bloc industrial specialization. As noted by János Kornai, COMECON represented “a real attempt to construct an alternative to capitalist globalization” but eventually fell victim to internal inefficiencies and dependence on Soviet leadership (Kornai, 1992).

The collapse of these structures after 1989 left a profound void. As Samir Amin observed, “the disintegration of the socialist bloc meant the loss of a counterweight to imperialist globalization” (Amin, 2013). Without an international institutional framework, contemporary socialist states became more vulnerable to integration into global capitalist markets.

Their collapse left a void that newer groupings such as BRICS have failed to fill. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), despite its anti-hegemonic posture, lacks ideological unity or a commitment to socialism. It is a strategic bloc, not a revolutionary front. This emergence in the 21st century raised hopes of a new counter-hegemonic alignment. It called for financial reform, development equity, and de-dollarization of global trade. Yet BRICS lacks a unifying ideology or shared political economy. As Patrick Bond critiques, “BRICS is not anti-capitalist or anti-imperialist; rather, it is sub-imperialist—seeking better terms within the existing order” (Bond, 2015).

The internal contradictions of BRICS are stark. China and India are geopolitical rivals; Russia is a resource-driven oligarchy; Brazil and South Africa remain dependent on Western capital. While China nominally adheres to socialism, its use of BRICS has been largely instrumental, advancing state capitalist expansion rather than proletarian internationalism (Hung, 2011).

Hence, BRICS represents “strategic diversification” rather than revolutionary alignment. It challenges Western dominance without offering a coherent or socialist alternative. As Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin argue, “multipolarity should not be confused with anti-capitalist transformation. A world of multiple capitalist centers is still a capitalist world” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012). 

Similarly, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—once a banner for Third World sovereignty—has lost much of its radicalism, now often reduced to diplomatic formalism. Inaugurated in 1961, NAM was once a powerful force for decolonization, development, and geopolitical neutrality. It aligned itself with the broader goals of the Global South, seeking to avoid entanglement in Cold War rivalries while supporting economic sovereignty. As Vijay Prashad recounts, “the NAM demanded a New International Economic Order... premised on fairness, equity, and sovereignty” (Prashad, 2007).

However, by the 1990s, NAM had drifted from its transformative roots. Lacking ideological clarity and weakened by neoliberal reforms in member states, it became what historian Robert Vitalis calls “a diplomatic zombie—alive in name, but devoid of political will” (Vitalis, 2015). Its once-radical platform has been reduced to non-binding communiqués, unable to mount collective resistance to neoliberal globalization.

The institutional atrophy of former socialist coordination bodies has intensified the burden on individual socialist states, forcing them to navigate global capitalism tactically and unilaterally. In the absence of supportive blocs or a cohesive international alternative, these governments face a profound dilemma: either engage with the market on their own terms to preserve internal cohesion and autonomy, or risk political isolation and economic collapse. This vacuum accentuates the condition of necessariable retreat—a reluctant but strategic withdrawal into pragmatic engagement with capitalism in the absence of external socialist support.

Rosa Luxemburg’s prescient warning—that “the fate of the revolution does not lie in one country alone” (Luxemburg, 1918)—finds renewed relevance. In the absence of a global revolutionary framework, individual socialist states retreat into tactical accommodations. The necessariable condition arises precisely because the internationalist scaffolding necessary for revolution’s next phase has been dismantled.

This vacuum ensures that even states with nominally socialist goals—China, Vietnam, Cuba—must operate under global capitalist norms. As Michael Lebowitz writes, “socialism cannot be built in isolation. Without internationalism, socialism stagnates or turns into its opposite” (Lebowitz, 2012). Necessaribility, then, is not a betrayal, but a reflection of geopolitical constraint.

To move beyond this phase, a new form of revolutionary internationalism must arise—one that transcends both the Cold War bipolar model and BRICS-style pragmatism. Such a formation would need to combine ideological clarity, institutional capacity, and economic coordination. Until then, socialist states remain suspended in a state of strategic necessity, navigating global capitalism not by choice, but by historical compulsion.

Conclusion: Everything Becomes Necessariable
—But Not Permanently

The concept of necessariable provides a theoretical tool for interpreting the paradoxes of contemporary socialist practice. Revolutionary struggle, as history demonstrates, is not linear but dialectical—marked by advance, pause, retreat, and renewal. What distinguishes revolutionary pause from reformist stagnation is political will—the determination to use tactical retreat not as an end but as a condition for re-advancement.

The necessariable condition does not doom socialist states to permanent compromise. On the contrary, it can be a transformative strategy—a crucible in which tactical market engagement is not just tolerated, but ultimately weaponized to build the foundations of socialism. That is, the necessariable scenario can break the cycle of deferred revolution, especially if socialist states adhere to a political program wherein strategic retreat and selective adoption of market forces are explicitly framed as instruments to unleash productive capacities, concentrate capital under state direction, and eventually transform those very market foundations into the infrastructure of socialist development.

Such a process must be intentional, transparent in its aims, and tightly bound to revolutionary consciousness. It requires ideological discipline, mass participation, and leadership committed not to perpetual adaptation but to dialectical transcendence.

Whether contemporary socialist states retain the capacity to move beyond accommodation remains an open question. China and Vietnam’s path may risk entrenching capitalist logics, while Cuba offers a vision of principled negotiation. North Korea, meanwhile, reflects the limits of isolation.

To understand the global Left’s position today is to recognize that everything becomes necessariable: all revolutionary aims must now pass through the crucible of strategic deferral, dialectical reassessment, and material recalibration. But the true test lies in whether necessaribility becomes not a euphemism for indefinite delay—but the precondition for the next leap forward.

***

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