Of Paper Gains and Public Pains:
What the 2025 State of the Nation Address didn’t Fix the mess?
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s fourth State of the Nation Address may have been his briefest, but it was also his most strident. With a speech laden with admonitions rather than celebration, Marcos sent a clear message to bureaucrats, contractors, syndicates, and even Congress: shape up or face the consequences.
Delivered with the gravitas of an increasingly impatient executive, the SONA marked a rhetorical shift from optimism to warning. Gone was the sunny “unity” theme of 2022. In its place: a no-nonsense tone that pointed to institutional decay and demanded action from the very machinery the President had relied on for three years.
Yet observers are asking: Are these warnings the start of a cleanup—or a late realization of governance shortcomings?
The Floods that Drowned Excuses:
When Pride in Public Works Meets the Rot Beneath
President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s harshest criticism during his 2025 State of the Nation Address was reserved for what should have been his administration’s showcase achievement: infrastructure. With the trademark rhetoric of indignation—“Mahiya kayo”—he lambasted officials and contractors behind failed flood control projects that crumbled during the onslaught of typhoons Crising, Dante, and Emong, and the seasonal deluge of the southwest monsoon. But a deeper reading of his rebuke raises a more troubling question: How did the very flagship of this administration—its proud infrastructure agenda—become a symbol of dysfunction and deceit?
Just last year, the President celebrated the acceleration of his Build Better More program, boasting of new expressways, bridges, ports, and drainage systems under what he called a “Golden Age of Infrastructure Continuity.” In fact, under his 2024 SONA, Marcos proudly declared that "public infrastructure has never been more ambitious and more essential."
Indeed, on paper, the investment has been enormous. The Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) was allocated a record ₱894 billion for FY 2024, with ₱255.4 billion specifically earmarked for flood mitigation and drainage improvement programs. This represented a 10% increase from the 2023 budget, underscoring the administration’s emphasis on disaster preparedness in the age of climate volatility.
And yet, the storms came—and so did the floods.
Cracks in the Foundation: Audits and Anomalies
Marcos’ description of some flood projects as “imaginary” was not political hyperbole. A 2023 Commission on Audit (COA) report revealed that more than ₱12.4 billion worth of flood mitigation projects were either incomplete, defective, overpriced, or supported by insufficient documentation. The most alarming irregularities were found in Regions III, IV-A, NCR, and Western Visayas, all of which are high-risk flood zones.
In Central Luzon, COA flagged 28 projects where improper concrete mixtures were used—significantly reducing their lifespan and flood resistance. Some dikes were found to have walls only 60% as thick as originally specified. One embankment in Pampanga collapsed just six months after completion. In NCR, multiple drainage system upgrades were either unfinished or found to be non-functional, despite full disbursement of funds.
It’s worth noting that several of these projects were listed under “completed” status in DPWH’s official transparency portal.
Worse still, the 2024 midyear NDRRMC assessment reported that flash floods from June to July displaced over 322,000 residents, destroyed 6,400 homes, and caused ₱4.3 billion in damage to public infrastructure. In Eastern Visayas and Southern Tagalog, many barangays remained submerged for days due to collapsed dikes, silted canals, and non-operational pumping stations—all of which had been the subject of flood control budgets in the previous three years.
The Illusion of Delivery: Milking the Infrastructure Cow
The hard truth is that infrastructure—long romanticized as a legacy of nation-building—has also become one of the most notoriously corrupt sectors in Philippine governance. From padded contracts to ghost projects and rigged biddings, public works often serve as lucrative conduits for political patronage and bureaucratic enrichment.
Transparency International’s 2024 report placed the Philippines at 115th out of 180 countries in its Corruption Perceptions Index, noting particularly that “infrastructure and procurement remain high-risk sectors for graft.” Meanwhile, in a survey by Social Weather Stations (SWS) conducted in February 2025, 67% of respondents believed that “a significant portion” of infrastructure funds are lost to corruption.
The public suspicion is not unfounded. Whistleblowers within DPWH have previously cited “standard operating procedures” (SOPs)—an unofficial term for expected kickbacks—ranging from 10% to 30% of a project’s cost, usually distributed between engineers, regional directors, local executives, and their chosen contractors.
In 2022, former DPWH Secretary Rogelio Singson warned that unless the procurement process was reformed, “every kilometer of road and every meter of flood canal could become a milking cow.”
What happens then is an economy of half-baked edifices, where canals clog weeks after opening, pump stations falter in the first heavy rain, and retaining walls break under minor pressure—all while officials tout ribbon cuttings and billboard ceremonies.
A Political Paradox: Condemning the Very House You Built
The President's open criticism of failed flood control projects, while bold, also opens a contradiction. If these projects are indeed riddled with anomalies, then where does the buck stop?
After all, the Build Better More program is the crown jewel of the Marcos administration. The President himself has led groundbreaking ceremonies, inaugurated bridges, and posed beside flood barriers built under his watch. He took credit when these projects were launched—must he not also take responsibility when they fail?
In 2023 alone, over 4,800 infrastructure projects were tagged as “completed” on DPWH's online tracker. Yet site validations by civil society groups, such as the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), reveal that many of these are either under construction, missing, or already damaged. A PCIJ study in late 2024 found that 1 in every 5 “completed” projects in flood-prone areas had major functional deficiencies within a year of completion.
So when the President says, “Let’s not pretend anymore,” the public might rightly ask: who was pretending—and for how long?
Marcos ordered the DPWH to submit a comprehensive list of all flood control projects initiated or completed in the last three years. He also instructed Regional Project Monitoring Committees to verify project completion, promising to release the full list to the public. If implemented rigorously and transparently, this could mark a turning point in government accountability.
But past efforts suggest caution. In 2019, a similar audit was ordered under the Duterte administration. The results were never made public.
As Marcos continues to double down on infrastructure as a legacy pillar, the challenge is no longer just about building more—it is about building with integrity. And unless systemic reforms are enacted—particularly in procurement, audit enforcement, and contractor vetting—the Philippines will continue to drown not just in rainwater, but in excuses dressed as public works.
The storms will come again. The question is whether the next floods will wash away homes—or finally, the old ways.
A Veto and a Warning: Power, Pork,
and the Specter of Bureaucrat Capitalism
In what may go down as one of the most combative lines of his fourth State of the Nation Address, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. warned Congress that he would veto the entire 2026 national budget if it is not aligned with his administration’s National Expenditure Program (NEP)—even at the cost of operating under a reenacted budget.
On paper, this declaration might appear as a principled stand against waste, inefficiency, and the chaotic practice of post-enactment budget realignments. But read in context, it reveals something deeper: a power struggle within the state itself. One between executive control and congressional clout, between national planning and local political survival—and more subtly, between technocratic planning and bureaucrat capitalism in its evolving Filipino form.
Realignment or Patronage? The Hidden Cost of “Insertions”
In 2024, a staggering ₱49 billion worth of budget realignments—commonly referred to as “congressional insertions”—made it into the General Appropriations Act, despite formal objections from the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). These insertions, often labeled “For Later Release,” allow lawmakers to earmark funds for pet projects or preferred contractors, frequently with little regard for national planning priorities.
In many cases, these funds are diverted to programs under local infrastructure, livelihood kits, or medical assistance, administered via local intermediaries or partner NGOs—many of which are linked to political backers or shell groups. In 2023, the COA flagged ₱2.7 billion worth of such congressional realignments as “high-risk” for fraud or redundancy.
While the President’s threat of a veto sends a strong signal, it also reveals that the palace may be struggling to assert authority over Congress’ growing grip on the budget process. Critics from the opposition and civil society have noted that despite the administration’s rhetoric on rational spending, Palace-approved budgets have continued to accommodate backroom deals, especially for key allies in the House and Senate.
Still, a case of Bureaucrat Capitalism
The concept of bureaucrat capitalism—often used by Marxist-Leninist analysts in the Philippines—refers to how elected and appointed officials use the powers of the state to enrich themselves, their families, or their class allies. In the post-EDSA era, this has evolved not only through corruption in procurement and public works, but increasingly through strategic budget allocations, disguised under populist or developmental programs.
It is in this light that the President’s warning to Congress should be viewed. If the infrastructure sector is a “milking cow” for contractors and engineers, as he warned during his tirade on flood control, then the budget process itself is the field where these cows are fattened.
Notably, 62% of discretionary infrastructure funds in the 2024 national budget were classified as “congressional-introduced items” according to data from the Philippine Center for Policy Reform—meaning these were not included in the executive’s NEP submission but were later added during plenary deliberations. Many of these allocations—often less than ₱50 million each—go unnoticed but add up to billions that evade long-term planning frameworks.
The Lingering Memory of Confidential Funds
The President’s broadside against congressional manipulation also comes in the wake of one of the more contentious public debates over discretionary spending: the issue of confidential and intelligence funds (CIFs). Public outrage peaked in late 2023 and early 2024 when it was revealed that the Office of the Vice President received over ₱500 million in CIFs from off-budget sources, including transfers from the Office of the President and underutilized agency funds.
According to a 2024 Senate Committee Report, the OVP’s CIF usage lacked detailed liquidation and was used in part for “security operations and barangay-level network development”—a term that many critics said pointed not to external threats, but to political consolidation efforts.
The controversy spurred a COA special audit, which to this day has not been publicly released in full. Yet the damage was done: public trust in confidential fund use dropped to 19% according to an April 2024 Pulse Asia poll, and Congress was forced to amend CIF guidelines in the 2025 budget.
It is within this climate of distrust that the President now promises transparency and alignment in future budgets. But it remains to be seen whether that promise will be enforced across the board—or selectively wielded against political opponents while shielding favored allies.
The Risk of a Reenacted Budget: Who Gets Hurt?
While a presidential veto might appeal to the moral high ground, the implications of a reenacted budget are serious and far-reaching.
According to a 2025 IBON Foundation study, reenacted budgets lead to an average 15% slowdown in project implementation, particularly in infrastructure, education, and health—sectors that require new appropriations each year for upgrades, expansion, or continuity.
Under a reenacted budget, new road projects are delayed, school construction is frozen, and social protection programs (like 4Ps) receive only maintenance-level funding. This disproportionately affects provincial areas that rely on newly programmed budgets—while entrenched central offices in Metro Manila retain most of their baseline funding.
For example, the Department of Education had proposed the construction of 7,400 new classrooms in 2026, primarily in BARMM and rural Mindanao. If the 2025 budget is reenacted, only 35% of that plan can be implemented, based on existing Multi-Year Obligational Authorities (MYOAs).
What the people are seeing is more than just a technical budgeting issue. It is a political battlefield. The President’s threat to wield the veto pen is a bold assertion of executive discipline—but it also reveals the fragility of state coherence in the Philippines.
When both the legislative and executive branches are populated by patronage-driven elites, budget alignment becomes not just a matter of policy—but a contest of fiefdoms.
Unless the President backs up his warning with structural reforms—like full public transparency in budget negotiations, real-time release of budget dashboards, and the criminalization of “padrino-funded” ghost projects—the cycle will continue: pork rebranded as progress, and planning subordinated to politics.
The President may be correct in asserting his right to reject budgets that betray the national interest. But the Filipino people have long learned to be skeptical: it is not enough to say no to corruption—one must also say no to complicity.
And so the real question is not just whether the 2026 budget will be vetoed—but whether the veto itself will be used as a weapon of reform, or as another tool in the endless chessboard of bureaucrat capitalism.
Rice Cartels and Economic Sabotage:
When Promises Rot in the Sack
In one of the SONA’s most emotionally charged moments, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. thundered a declaration of war—not against an external threat, but against an internal enemy: rice cartels, hoarders, and price manipulators. He called their actions “economic sabotage,” a crime that, while not new to the Filipino vocabulary, now finds renewed political theater under his administration.
But behind the drama of this condemnation lies an uncomfortable truth: the President himself once campaigned on the populist promise of bringing down rice prices to ₱20 per kilo—a promise that, nearly three years into his term, is fast becoming either a cruel joke or an impossible dream, depending on who's been asked in the market.
The Numbers Don’t Lie—They Hurt
As of June 2025, rice inflation climbed to 11.1% year-on-year, according to the Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA). While farmers continue to sell palay at ₱23.15 per kilo—a price that has barely moved since mid-2023—retail prices in Metro Manila, Central Luzon, and parts of Western Visayas have breached ₱60 per kilo, more than double the President's campaign promise.
In wet markets in Quezon City, San Jose del Monte, and Iloilo City, regular milled rice now sells between ₱52 to ₱58, with premium varieties reaching as high as ₱66 to ₱70, according to Bantay Bigas and verified by DA market monitoring bulletins.
In contrast, government subsidy efforts such as Kadiwa stores only provide limited relief—serving less than 4% of the total rice-buying public, based on Department of Agriculture (DA) distribution data as of May 2025. These short-lived market interventions are easily overwhelmed by commercial players who dominate the wholesale and retail chains.
Import Dependency and the Rice Tariffication Backfire
The Rice Tariffication Law (RTL) of 2019 was sold to the public with two primary promises: stabilized prices through import liberalization, and improved productivity through the Rice Competitiveness Enhancement Fund (RCEF).
Six years later, both promises are under fire. According to PSA and DA data, the Philippines is now importing 20.5% of its national rice supply, up from 13% in 2018. The bulk of imports comes from Vietnam and Thailand, often with prices fluctuating due to global market shocks, logistics costs, and exchange rate volatility.
Worse, a 2024 study by the Federation of Free Farmers (FFF) revealed that less than 60% of the ₱10 billion RCEF reaches smallholder farmers in the form of tangible support—whether in farm machinery, seeds, or training. Many barangay-level cooperatives tasked with distribution report delays in delivery, missing allocations, or poor coordination with local government units.
Thus, while imported rice is supposed to bring down market prices, it also crowds out locally produced rice, depressing farmgate prices and disincentivizing domestic production. This contradictory cycle not only undermines food security—it destroys food sovereignty, a term increasingly used by peasant groups and food justice advocates.
Cartelization and the Politics of Hoarding
In July 2025, Bantay Bigas and Agriwatch PH released a joint investigation showing that several rice warehouses in Bulacan, Isabela, and Nueva Ecija—the so-called “rice triangle”—were directly linked to corporate entities with political backers, many of whom are repeat beneficiaries of National Food Authority (NFA) import permits and transportation subsidies.
Some of these warehouses were found to be storing massive volumes of imported rice even during harvest season—leading to an artificial oversupply on paper and undervaluing of palay in practice. Despite anti-hoarding laws, enforcement has been lax. Only six hoarding-related cases have led to prosecution since 2022, and none have yet resulted in conviction.
According to former Agriculture Undersecretary Fermin Adriano, the rice trade in the Philippines is controlled by no more than 15 major players, each with vertically integrated control of importation, warehousing, milling, and retail distribution. “They are too big to regulate and too well-connected to punish,” Adriano said in a recent forum.
Wasted Harvests and the Collapse of Farmgate Confidence
The tragedy does not end with rice.
In April and May 2025, tons of cabbage, tomatoes, and carrots were dumped in the mountains of Benguet and Nueva Vizcaya—left to rot because no traders or middlemen arrived to buy them. Farmers had overproduced, relying on last year’s seasonal cycle. But with no coordinated marketing support or buyer matching by the DA, their produce became trash instead of food.
The same occurred in Bukidnon and South Cotabato, where white corn and green onions were sold at ₱3–5 per kilo, despite costing ₱10 or more to grow. Without sufficient cold storage, logistics, or price stabilization mechanisms, farmers suffer while urban consumers still pay high prices.
Even the President’s Kadiwa centers can only do so much. Of the over 1,200 Kadiwa outlets launched since 2022, only about 300 remain regularly operational, according to a COA audit of the Office of the President's Special Programs Unit in early 2025. Most lack consistent supply chains, budget continuity, or coordination with farmer cooperatives.
Food Security vs. Food Sovereignty
This all begs the question: if the administration claims to be committed to food security, why are these systemic failures not just persisting—but worsening?
Food security is often defined in technocratic terms: calories available, supply chains maintained, price thresholds met. But food sovereignty—the idea that Filipinos should control the means and logic of their own food systems—goes deeper. It demands accountability from government, transparency from traders, and above all, justice for producers.
And if there’s anything this rice crisis reveals, it’s that sovereignty has long been surrendered to bureaucratic opportunism, oligarchic middlemen, and policy paralysis.
Three years ago, Marcos Jr. told voters that ₱20 rice was within reach. What they have received instead are ₱60 per kilo price tags, rotting vegetables, and a rice sector dominated by cartels with political shields.
The war he declared at the SONA is justified—but unless followed by massive enforcement, institutional reforms, and redistribution of market access, it will be just another headline.
If Marcos truly wants to fulfill his mandate, he must move beyond slogans. Because for the farmers whose hands sow the grain, and for the families scraping their last peso in the palengke, the real enemy isn’t just economic sabotage. It’s a system that rewards greed and punishes labor—and it’s been winning for far too long.
The Power Crisis: Siquijor as Microcosm
Siquijor’s persistent brownouts, lasting up to 14 hours a day in June, were used as a symbol of systemic failure in energy governance. The President blamed expired permits, broken equipment, and poor procurement, and vowed normal service by year-end.
The Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) confirmed in a July audit that 63% of small island grids across the country are operating with over-aged or unlicensed generators, and at least eight provinces report monthly outages exceeding 60 hours.
Marcos has directed the Department of Energy (DOE) and National Electrification Administration (NEA) to intervene—but analysts warn that the country’s power reliability, measured by the System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI), remains one of the worst in ASEAN at 11.4 hours per customer per year. Compare that to 0.6 hours in Singapore and 2.4 in Thailand.
Agencies on Notice: A Bureaucracy in a Hot Seat
In one of the more pointed portions of President Marcos Jr.’s address, he zeroed in on the inefficiencies of frontline agencies—chief among them the Land Transportation Office (LTO) and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)—demanding an end to long-standing backlogs and bureaucratic sluggishness that have come to symbolize public frustration with government services.
The LTO’s License Plate Debacle: A Crisis of Credibility
The President’s order for the LTO to clear all backlogs and release motor vehicle registrations within three working days is not new in intent—but it is striking in tone. It reflects a growing exasperation over an issue that has refused to go away despite billions of pesos in appropriations and repeated promises from agency leadership.
According to the Department of Transportation’s Q2 2025 Performance Audit, the LTO currently has a backlog of 2.1 million license plates, and over 600,000 unprocessed vehicle registration renewals as of June 2025. These delays are not merely an inconvenience—they have direct legal and financial consequences for motorists, many of whom face penalties or roadside apprehensions despite having fulfilled their obligations to the government.
Much of the bottleneck stems from the Plate Making Plant (PMP), inaugurated in 2018, which was supposed to solve the backlog. Yet reports indicate that the plant is operating at only 63% of its intended capacity due to outdated machinery and procurement inefficiencies.
In 2023, the Commission on Audit (COA) flagged the LTO for ₱1.2 billion worth of undelivered plates despite full payment to contractors. Furthermore, a Senate Blue Ribbon Committee hearing in February 2024 revealed systemic mismanagement in supply chain contracts, including multiple instances of non-competitive bidding and expired memoranda of agreement with local manufacturers.
Public patience is wearing thin. A recent SWS survey from April 2025 showed that 78% of Filipinos had a "dissatisfied" or "very dissatisfied" experience with LTO services, particularly in urban centers like Metro Manila, Davao, and Cebu.
TESDA and the Misalignment of Technical Education
The President also called upon TESDA to do more than offer vocational programs—he urged the agency to actively promote technical education to Filipino parents, framing it as a viable, dignified alternative to four-year college degrees. This pivot reflects a wider recognition of the mismatch between academic output and labor market demand.
Currently, TESDA operates over 4,000 training institutions nationwide, yet utilization rates hover at just 52%, according to its own 2024 Year-End Report. Enrollment in critical sectors such as construction, manufacturing, and agri-mechanics remains low, even though these sectors have high job absorption rates and growing foreign employer demand.
In a May 2025 roundtable hosted by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), several business groups—including the Philippine Constructors Association and Electronics Industry Association—flagged the “oversupply of business administration graduates” and the “undersupply of NC-certified technical workers.”
TESDA's budget for 2025 was increased to ₱21.4 billion, but stakeholders say the agency still lacks the media presence, marketing tools, and grassroots penetration to convince families—especially in rural and lower-middle-class communities—that vocational training leads to stable employment. A DepEd survey in early 2025 showed that 62% of parents still believe a four-year college degree is the only path to “upward mobility,” indicating persistent stigma around blue-collar professions.
What makes the President’s directive notable is its explicit timeline and tone of finality—signaling that delays, inefficiencies, and excuses will no longer be tolerated. Yet it also signals an urgent need for internal reform and leadership overhaul within these agencies.
Both the LTO and TESDA have the mandates, the funding, and now—clearly—the political backing. What remains to be seen is whether they have the competence, discipline, and urgency to match the President’s rhetoric with results.
If they do not, the public’s frustration may soon evolve into active resistance—not just to the agencies in question, but to the administration that shields them.
The Power Crisis: Siquijor as Microcosm of a National Breakdown
Siquijor, long mythologized as an island of mystics and moonlight, now finds itself in the headlines for something far more earthly: darkness of a literal kind. In June 2025, residents endured daily brownouts lasting up to 14 hours. Schools were forced to cancel classes, small businesses operated by candlelight, and households rationed electricity like wartime essentials.
In his speech, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. pointed to the Siquijor crisis as a symbol of systemic failure in Philippine energy governance. He cited expired permits, broken generation sets, and flawed procurement systems, pledging normal service by the end of the year.
But Siquijor is not an anomaly—it is a symptom of a nationwide energy disorder.
A Grid in Crisis
According to a July 2025 audit by the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), 63% of small island grids in the Philippines operate with over-aged or unlicensed generator sets. These aging power sources fail to meet both environmental and operational standards, resulting in frequent outages, high operating costs, and unreliable service.
At least eight provinces, including Palawan, Marinduque, Batanes, Camiguin, Basilan, Masbate, Dinagat Islands, and Siquijor, report monthly power interruptions exceeding 60 hours, or the equivalent of 2.5 days per month without electricity.
In a country striving for middle-income status, such figures would be embarrassing. For the Philippines, they are a reminder that its energy infrastructure remains rooted in 20th-century stopgap measures: diesel generators, isolated microgrids, and government subsidies that often go unpaid.
SAIDI: One of the Worst in ASEAN
The System Average Interruption Duration Index (SAIDI)—an international benchmark for power reliability—measures the average outage duration per customer annually. As of 2024, the Philippines clocks in at 11.4 hours per year, placing it among the worst in Southeast Asia.
To put this in perspective:
- Singapore: 0.6 hours
- Thailand: 2.4 hours
- Vietnam: 3.1 hours
- Malaysia: 1.5 hours
- Philippines: 11.4 hours
Even Metro Manila, which draws its power from the country’s most stable grid, experiences localized brownouts during peak summer months due to thin reserves and underinvestment in baseload capacity. In Mindanao and the Visayas, outages are so frequent that diesel generators are considered essential appliances by middle-income households.
The NGCP Conundrum
The President's speech notably avoided a deeper discussion on national grid governance—particularly the long-running controversy surrounding the National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (NGCP).
The NGCP, which operates the country’s transmission network, remains 60% privately owned, with 40% of that stake held by the State Grid Corporation of China (SGCC). This has raised sovereignty and cybersecurity concerns since the arrangement was inked in 2009.
As early as 2020, former Energy Secretary Alfonso Cusi warned of a “national security risk” if NGCP remained under indirect foreign control. The same concern was echoed by the National Security Council in 2023, citing delays in grid modernization projects and the risk of sabotage during geopolitical tension.
In May 2024, the Senate Energy Committee uncovered that 17 out of 32 NGCP grid reinforcement projects had missed deadlines, while the company posted ₱24 billion in net income in the same year. Critics argue that NGCP prioritizes profits over grid resilience, reinvesting less than 40% of its revenue into infrastructure—well below the global average for transmission utilities.
Institutional Disconnect and Regulatory Gaps
President Marcos has directed the Department of Energy (DOE) and the National Electrification Administration (NEA) to "intervene" in areas with persistent outages, but analysts argue that the problem lies beyond intervention—it requires structural reform.
For example: The Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of 2001 broke up the vertically integrated monopoly of the National Power Corporation, but it also created regulatory gaps where no single agency has full control over generation, transmission, and distribution.
While DOE sets policy, NEA regulates cooperatives, and NGCP runs the grid, coordination is poor, and accountability is fragmented.
Even the missionary electrification subsidy, which funds electricity in remote areas, is under threat. Unpaid debts to small island power providers now total over ₱1.3 billion, according to a 2025 DOE report. Without prompt payment, these companies either shut down or pass on the cost to already burdened consumers.
The Renewable Mirage?
Much has been said about transitioning to renewable energy. Indeed, the Philippines boasts over 500,000 megawatts of potential renewable energy capacity, including geothermal, hydro, solar, and wind. Yet, as of June 2025, only 22% of the national energy mix is renewable, with coal still dominating at 43%.
While the DOE has launched the Green Energy Auction Program (GEAP) to fast-track solar and wind investments, grid congestion and interconnection delays continue to hamper progress. In Mindoro and Samar, for instance, new solar farms cannot export electricity due to outdated substations and overloaded transmission lines.
A 2024 World Bank report noted that it takes an average of 4–5 years to fully operationalize a renewable energy project in the Philippines, compared to 2 years in Vietnam and 18 months in Malaysia. The bureaucracy, not the sunlight, is the obstacle.
Political Power, Electric Power
At the heart of the crisis is a deep politicization of the energy sector. The President’s pledge to fix Siquijor by year-end is welcome—but solving Siquijor’s blackout is like replacing a bulb in a collapsing house.
Real reform requires:
- A national energy sovereignty policy that reclaims grid ownership from foreign interests;
- A rationalized, publicly transparent investment plan for island grids and renewables;
- And enforcement teeth for ERC and DOE, who too often issue warnings without consequences.
Until then, the flicker of electricity in Siquijor and other islands will remain symbolic—not of hope—but of a nation still fumbling in the dark.
Because in the end, electricity is not just about power. It is about governance, equity, and national dignity. And if our leaders cannot keep the lights on, perhaps it is time we ask whether they still deserve to hold the switch.
Performance vs. Perception:
A Democracy of Surveys or Survival?
When Marcos took the podium with confidence, citing economic figures meant to reassure a weary public: inflation has cooled to 3.1%, unemployment hovers at 4.0%, and 2.5 million households have been newly connected to the power grid since 2022. He pointed to "real wins"—from intensified drug enforcement to long-delayed Dalian train carriages finally running the tracks of Metro Manila.
On paper, the numbers signal momentum. But on the streets, in the markets, in the provinces, the applause is faint.
A July 2025 Pulse Asia survey reflects the divide: while 39% approve of the President’s performance, 47% of respondents said they "personally feel no change" in their quality of life since 2022. Another 21% said their lives have worsened. These are not statistical margins. They are lived realities.
And it raises a deeper question: Is this still democracy—or demographcy?
The Age of Quantified Consent
For decades, surveys like those by Pulse Asia and Social Weather Stations (SWS) have become political barometers. Approval ratings are now more than public sentiment—they are political capital, used by governments to justify decisions and used by critics to question mandates.
But when survey metrics become substitutes for community engagement, democracy becomes demographcy: a system that governs based on respondent counts, not lived consensus.
- While unemployment is officially at 4.0%, underemployment remains at 12.7%, with most informal workers earning below ₱350/day—far from the family living wage of ₱1,160/day as calculated by IBON Foundation.
- Official inflation may sit below 3.2%, but rice, fuel, transport, and tuition fees—the core of household expenses—have all surged well beyond this index.
- The much-hailed Dalian trains may run now, but Metro Manila’s commuters still face average wait times of 35–50 minutes per ride, according to the DOTr's own 2024 Transit Efficiency Report.
As an observer at the Ateneo Policy Center noted, “The macro is improving—but the micro remains neglected.” That is, GDP is rising, but people’s stomachs, time, and dignity remain under strain.
The Illusion of Connection
When the President claims 2.5 million households were "energized," that statement should spark applause. But what’s left unsaid is that many of these connections are partial or intermittent, especially in off-grid or island communities. The DOE’s 2024 Electrification Compliance Report shows that 31% of new connections still experience more than 60 hours of monthly outages.
Meanwhile, sari-sari store owners in Tondo, farmers in Pangasinan, and teachers in Masbate still ask: "What use is electricity if the power's out when I need to cook or charge a phone?"
Likewise, the promise of infrastructure—the great political fix-all of the Build, Better, More program—is met with skepticism. Skyways and airports rise, but urban congestion persists, housing remains out of reach, and mass transit outside Metro Manila is near non-existent.
Beyond the Numbers: The Political Disconnect
Analysts point out that the government’s metrics often speak to boardrooms and donors, not barangays. The language of kilometers of road built, jobs created, inflation controlled—while important—does not always translate to what families feel:
- That food is still expensive,
- That hospitals remain overcrowded,
- That jobs don’t pay enough to raise a family.
It is in this context that survey skepticism emerges. As one community organizer in Quezon City remarked: "Democracy now feels like something that happens between survey cycles. Not in the streets, not in the barangay halls."
And indeed, this overreliance on polling metrics, often limited to 1,200 respondents, starts to look less like participatory governance and more like corporate-style consumer sampling—a far cry from genuine political accountability.
Whereas democracy is the rule of the people, demographcy is the rule of their averaged opinions, weighted, rounded off, and aggregated. The danger is clear: when leaders prioritize perception over lived experience, they govern polls, not people.
The President may indeed be presiding over real economic upticks. But policy is not perception, and governance is not just managing figures—it’s nurturing trust.
The public is no longer asking for miracle GDP growth. They are asking for tangible relief—affordable food, accessible transport, jobs that pay, and lives that matter.
Until such needs are visibly addressed, even the best surveys may only reflect a shallow consensus, not a shared future.
Because the real approval rating cannot be found on paper.
It is in the mood of the market.
In the silence of the worker.
In the sighs of a classroom.
And in the conviction of a community, still waiting to be heard.
A Rhetorical Shift—But Is It Too Late?
The SONA’s dominant theme—accountability—marked a departure from Marcos Jr.’s earlier conciliatory tone. But political observers say that tone alone may not be enough to reverse midterm disillusionment.
The warnings delivered at the Batasang Pambansa were forceful. But for many Filipinos still ankle-deep in floodwater or stuck in blackout darkness, warnings are no longer sufficient. They need results.
Marcos Jr. has three years left to prove his administration can do more than diagnose the problems. It must now deliver the cures—or risk going down in the books as yet another government that knew what was wrong, but couldn’t—or wouldn’t—fix it.